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Abstract
This thesis takes as its premise the proposition that the
pattern of street rights-of-way (and, by implication, utility
alignments), blocks and parcelization are together the
strongest and most persistant determinants of urban form.
Certain design objectives are postulated--among them, clearly
defined street space--and three street patterns are tested with
a program combining two building types (office and parking
structure). One alternative is elaborated with illustrative
diagrams.
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The hypothesis is that the street pattern will be suffi-
cient to achieve the postulated design objectives. The thesis
concludes that additional controls are required.
Thesis Supervisor: Imre Halasz
Title: Professor of Architecture
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I. Introduction
There is a growing dissatisfaction with the emergent form
of new office districts. Stamford, Connecticut, has dismayed
prominent critics, and in Cambridge, Kendall Square seems un-
likely to add up to more than the sum of its parts. Examples
can be found in most other regions.
It is the job of urban design to give coherence to what is
otherwise an atomized development process. Left to their own
resources--as in Stamford--builders maximize the utility of
their own structures in terms of prominence, access, parking,
light, and 'views, but with few gestures to the larger environ-
ment. Planners have advocated an opposing model: mixed-use
projects integrated by multi-level circulation systems or mega-
structures. But investment practices have doomed all but a few
of the proposals, and most developments have proceeded in
fragmented form.
An old prototype of urban development reemerged in the
70s: the multi-purpose street as the prime organizing element.
2The integrated development was rejected in favor of a well-
formed, conventional street space defined by self-effacing
buildings. The evidence, though still sparse, indicates ready
acceptance of the model. It remains to be seen if the
projected forms emerge.
Chapter II of this thesis studies the evolution of the
"townscape" model within a broad outline of 20th century urban
design theory and practice. It identifies notable planning
innovations in New York City and San Francisco and identifies
concepts that may become powerful new urban design tools.
An attractive quality of the integrated development models
was their flexibility. Blocks were typically oversized, and
buildings could take virtually any form, size, or position.
The townscape model has less excess capacity: it must recog-
nize the dimensional and formal requirements of new uses if it
is to succeed. Chapter III studies three uses--offices,
retail, and parking--and identifies elements that are critical
to decisions on block and parcel sizes.
The thesis applies the townscape model to an actual site
in Boston's Fort Point Channel district. Chapter IV analyzes
the site and its context and highlights elements of the
existing built environment that could support the desired form
of new development.
Chapter V presents a set of design projections for the
3site. It evaluates the pattern of streets, blocks and parcels
in terms of its effectiveness in achieving the objectives of
the plan. It goes on to suggest additional guidelines for
achieving those objectives.
Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the thesis.
Finally, three case studies examine how other urban design
projects have dealt with a program and the pattern of streets,
blocks, and parcels. Conclusions are presented for each.
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511. Essay
E=d =9 g E Prototype 2j Office Development
Models of some kind must be used: one cannot
manage complex, real problems, under the pressures of
time, without employing prototypes already in the
head. The difficulty is not that we use prototypes,
but that our set is so limited, and so unrelated to
purpose and situation. A more systematic analysis of
precedent and an elaboration and analysis of new
prototypes are most important tasks for city design.
Indeed, we should be engaged in anticipatory design,
creating prototypes which will be useful for those
new situations and motives which are only unfolding
today. Lynch 1981
Second only to streets and parking lots, offices are the
dominant use of land in the city's central business district.
Office development is the symbol--and some would argue the
engine--of a city's economic development. Office buildings
6have become bulkier, taller and more numerous. Such powerful
trends have not gone either unnoticed or unopposed. Genuine
environmental, social and economic concerns have been raised.
Yet, in spite of high costs--not the least of which are
political considerations and the expense of land--corporations
continue to seek central city locations.
The debate over central city development pits two agendas
against one another: that of developers and tenants, and
another of CBD users.
The Busines Agend. The tenants of office buildings have
three primary interests:
1) high accessibility to suitably qualified labor;
2) high accessibility (preferably within walking distance)
to business clients and services; and
3) corporate visibility.
Central locations are preferred to suburban ones in spite
of the inconvenience and high cost of commuting. Thus, CBD
tenants are willing to pay two-thirds more rent per square foot
than they would pay for otherwise equivalent office space in
the suburbs. In the Boston metropolitan area, for example,
downtown Class A office space runs $30 to $45 per square foot
Spaulding & Slye as compared to $20 to $25 in the suburbs. CBDs continue to
capture 50 to 75 percent of regional office development.
7'h.C _21.. AggrdZ. The business agenda contrasts with the
interests of users of the central business district. This
thesis does not concern itself with city or regional scale
issues, though the benefits of employment (both construction
and permanent) and increased tax base should be acknowledged.
It should also be noted that office development imposes loads
on the city infrastructure that may more than offset tax
reccipts. Moreover, increased land values attributable to the
office market may also aggravate housing costs, directly
through competition for scarce land and indirectly by
attracting white-collar professionals who compete for central
cIty housing.
This thesis does concern itsclf with the interests of the
users of the central business district. Users, as a group, are
conceived in the broadest possible sense to include people who
work in, do business in or vi sit the CBD. They include even
those who seldom go there but to whom the city's center
embodies meaning, either positive or negative.
In only one sense can office growth be seen as an unquali-
fied boon to the users of the CBD: high-rises, as intcnscly
visible symbols of human achievement, have greatly enhanced
the city's "imageability" (as Lynch uses the term in .Te Imac
og~f _;bs _Cjty and elsewhere). As the edges of the city have Lynch 1960
become progressively more ill-defined, traditional andmar1s
8(such as Boston's Custom House tower) become hard-pressed to
focus the image of the city. In a very real sense, the "city"
(which now must be recognized as the economic region) becomes
defined as that area within sight of the city's office towers.
In all other respects, office development has had negative
or at best ambiguous effects, among them degradation of micro-
climate, destruction of historical buildings and districts,
alteration of familiar structures and surroundings, and
deadening of the street. The quality of street space and the
larger public realm (usually, but not always, publicly owned,
outdoor space) is the professional domain of the urban designer
and the specific concern of this thesis.
Ec-ps -of tbs Tb2ain. This thesis attempts to reconcile
the seemingly opposing interests of the business community
(landowners, developers, and corporative executives) and CBD
user as it applies to the quality of the public realm. it
seeks to do this in the context of a proposed prototype of
office development that is economically feasible and institu-
tional ly implementabic.
Basis .f .te Cutiqu
The criticism of contemporary office development is based
on a model of urban development that may be termed, generical-
ly, "townscape". The term is of British origin, and is identi-
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fied with the writings of Gordon Cullen. Townscape is one of Cullen
three generic urban spatial types, the other two being "table-
top" architecture (a common, though facetious, term) and the
othor characteristic of the suburban landscape.
Townscape has its origins in Camillo Sitte's City Tlanning
Accordinq to Artisti Principals although it is sympathetic (if Sitte
not born of) the English landscape park and the ._oLtg of
AWN Pugin. Kevin Lynch describes the spatial type:
...the streets and square were hollowed out of a
rather compact mass of buildings of moderate
height. The building facades may not have been com-
pletely continuous, but except for the occasional
landmark, they appeared as a unified if articulated
background for the open spaces cut into them. They
faced onto those spaces, and took their identity
therefrom.... This spatial framework might be an
ordered geometrical one, or more irregular and
mazelike. Lynch 1981
The second type is characterized by building masses ar-
ranged as isolated objects in space. The form is peculiar to
the 20th century, and its two most potent examples are the
government center at Chandigarh, India, by Le Corbusier, and
Brasilia by Lucio Costa. The most notorious example in this
country is the Empire State Plaza at Albany, New York. Le
Moos
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Corbusier was, arguably, the originator of this vision and
unquestionably its most vocal and persuasive proponent. A
generation of housing and urban renewal schemes are his legacy.
Le Corbusier himself disparaged Sitte and termed the
"German's" aesthetic "the Pack-Donkey's Way". Like many
others, Le Corbusier erroneously associated townscape with the
narrow, curved line. As Lynch's definition suggests, the
qualities of townscape--security, legibility, human scale and
livelineSs--are not associated exclusively with curvilinear
street patterns. San Francisco is the familiar example of a
rigidly ordered but richly picturesque urban form.
In fairness to Le Corbusier he sought an urban form that
not only accommodated the automobile (which townscape does
poorly if at all) but that wholeheartedly adopted it as the
generator of 20th century urban form. This writer defers to
other critics (such as YoShinobu Ashihara) to criticize the
model.
The third model of urban spatial structure is the "leafy
suburban scene". The model originates in the 18th century pic-
turscquc movcment (notably the English landscape gardens).
It's foremost advocate in America was Frederick Law Olmsted,
and its first manifestation was the community of Riverside,
Illinois, by Vaux and Olmsted in 1869. It is characterized by
broad winding streets, freestanding buildings set back from the
Ashihara 1970, 1983
street, and heavy landscaping. Its idealized antecedent is the
pre-industrial New England village. (But as John R. Stil goe
suggests, the New England common--the classic village set-
piece--was the creation of the 19th century even though the
land had been around since the 17th.) Originally a model of
residential development, it eventually was adapted to office,
warehousing and industrial uses probably for the first time in
1951 (Stanford Industrial Park) or 1952 (Mountain Brook Office
Park, near Birmingham, Alabama).
The townscape model has enjoyed considerable favor since
the publication of Jane Jacobs' Dfeatb aD-d 1112 of glegt
A icjD Cj~i and Gordon Cullen's .Tgw~ass22, both in 1961.
Sitte's own work was reprinted in 1965. Since then a host of
writers on urban design have reiterated and elaborated the
townscape model. Among them are Yoshinobu Ashihara (1970,
1983), Rob Krier, Christopher Alexander, and Colin Rowe and
Fred Koetter. It is interesting to note that Ashihara's first
book was published in Japan in 1962, but did not appear in
English for eight years. Krier dedicated his book to the
memory of Camillo Sitte, and Alexander cites Sitte to prove
Pattern 106, "Positive Outdoor Space".
To be sure, there are hybrids of the three models as well
as examples that do not fit comfortably in any one category.
The commercial strip has attributes of both the Corbusier and
Fleming and Halderman
O'Mara
ULI 1975
J. Jacobs
Cullen
Ashihara 1970, 1983
Krier
Alexander
Rowe and Koetter
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Sitte models, but disappoints the better expectations of each.
Also, as suburban densities increase--as in recent townhouse
and condominium developments--the potential for Sitte-like
forms emerges if the automobile problem is solved.
It is not the author's intent to argue the relative merits
of the three models. The suburban model, when well executed
(as at the Stanford Industrial Park or at the New England
Executive Office Park in Burlington, Mass.) offers a pleasing
vista even while it isolates workers from urban amenities.
Townscape is an attractive if romantic ideal always with the
caveat that it must learn to live with the automobile. It is
the most suitable model for a CBD location and the one that
will be applied in this thesis.
Critiaue of Current Offic Development
In its most general outline, the townscape model leads to
a critique of the contemporary office development (both
suburban and CBD) based on its tendency to locate building
masses in isolation from one another. The street space is
formless and the city becomes disjointed, episodic and il-
Lynch 1981 legible without the aid of signs and names. But these
criticisms reflect affection for urban forms that may or may
not have any relevance to the type of development in question.
Greater specificity is required.
Contemporary office development promotes the following
ills:
L G~ALD- The grain of the city is made coarser.
Mechanical ventilation and artificial lighting have allowed the
average floor area per floor (i.e., the "footprint") to in-
crease. Considerations of efficiency (measured by the ratio of
rentable to gross floor area) have generated the near-universal
25,000 to 40,000 square foot floor with central service core.
Large bay sizes (typically 25 or 30 feet between bearing
elements) are preferred to small. Thus, in a length of street
frontage that might once have contained three or four different
office buildings, one now stands. Even with sensitive and
small-scale detailing, less variety results.
Various writers have proposed that zoning and subdivision
regulations limit the maximum size of parcels in order to limit
the size of the building footprint. (Current regulations typi-
cally specify minima.) Presumably, buildings would be less
efficient, but since all new buildings within the jurisdiction
would be similarly affected, there would be no pricing handi-
caps. Existing and unregulated property would have an advan-
tage.
L Rhythm pf Entrances The rhythm of building entrances
becomes more attenuated. The larger building footprint
stretches the interval between entrances. Security, a
Vernez-Moudon 1983(a), 1983(b)
Appleyard and Jacobs
Gould
Kriken
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relatively new concern, dictates a single entrance. The single,
central elevator core pushes it towards the center of the
building.
, Ser~vicg Functions. Service docks and driveways occupy
proportionately more street frontage. The total building area
has increased more rapidly than the footprint (i.e. the floor-
area ratio or FAR has increased) and more supplies and waste
move in and out of a given length of building edge. Whereas
the sidewalk and a freight elevator served the small office
building, massive loading areas serve the high-rise.
AL ]ull diDS Ag Qbiscj;. It has long been known that
buildings advertise their tenants. It is perhaps specious to
observe that churches and palaces-have long located spiritual
and temporal power, but at least since 1913 (when the Wool-
worth Building began its 18-year reign as the world's tallest
building), office buildings have done more than house their
namesakes. Three phenomena have resulted:
a. Buildings are less known by their addresses than by
their prime tenants. A recent development in the
naming of buildings is the ubiquitous "One (something)
Place/Plaza/Center". The tenant is not always served
in name, but is given a unique location. In this
regard it is startling to see buildings at formerly
prestigious addresses (e.g. Dewey Square or 53 State
15
Street, Boston) relocated to unidentifiable sites
(e.g., One Financial Center or Exchange Place). In
consequence, one or a few such places may serve as
landmarks; dozens only confuse and reduce the legi-
bility of the city. As an analogy, to name seemingly
every intersection in New England "Somebody Square"
names none of them, since they defy memory.
b. Buildings shrink from the street and from one another,
protecting their security and privacy behind un-
furnished plazas and raised planters. The free-
standing tower is the result of at least three
factors: the demand for maximum fenestrated perim-
eter; plazas required by zoning; and the preference of
designers (heirs to the Corbusian tradition) to the
singular "statement". All three have served the cor-
porate tenant's desire for a discrete location. The
street as a spatial form becomes shapeless.
The townscape model imputes virtue to streets
with positive form. (See, for example, Alexander,
Pattern 121). It is argued that a street or plaza is Alexander
more pleasing when it has the attributes of a well-
formed room: enclosure, detail, variety, etc. Since
the street space is perceived in motion more often
than from a stationary position, the street space is
16
New York Department of City Planning
San Francisco Department of City
Planning 1983(a)
Barnett
preferred that offers a sequence of pleasing forms
that nevertheless exhibit some underlying continuity.
(For example, views from one space into another link
successive experiences.)
Nevertheless, continuity of the "street wall"
has recently become as axiomatic as open space once
was. Buildings must toe the property line, preferably
without breaks. Where possible, cornices should be
uniform in height. Stories higher than the specified
cornice should be set back, preferably out of view of
the pedestrian. Recent developments have included
these requirements in design regulations. For
example, the plan of Skidmore Owings and Merrill
(Washington) for Capital Center in Providence, Rhode
Island, includes "build-to" lines and both minimum and
maximum building heights. Daylighting regulations
(such as those in the recently amended New York
Ordinance) promote the street wall and setback form.
c. With the exception of banks and airline offices,
storefronts have been banished from new buildings.
Perhaps no other trend has been more deadening to the
interest of street space. The reasons are obscure.
It appears that coffee shops, drugstores, printers and
sandwich counters compromise the up-scale image cor-
17
porate tenants seek. Even where prestigious uses are
allowed, they typically occupy all or major lengths of
long street frontages. The street loses variety and
interest for two reasons: there are fewer, different
uses, and the permitted uses disdain self-advertise-
ment. The second is perhaps more persuasive than the
former. (Certainly, department stores, which occupy
whole blocks, hold pedestrian interest with attractive
show windows.) Retail business by its very nature
seeks to attract and hold the interest of passersby.
The more businesses, the more competition, and the
more energetic the efforts to attract customers.
Short of strident cacophony (Las Vegas Strip or the
typical New York avenue), the retail street is more
interesting than the street of corporate headquarters.
Stated abstractly, retail frontage promotes
"exchange" between the pedestrian and the buildings
that crowd the street. Stores project themselves into
the street (visually, sometimes aurally, and, where
regulations permit, physically) and pedestrians pro-
ject themselves visually and physically into the
stores. It follows that the more entrances there are
(i.e., the more stores per unit street frontage) the
more intense the exchange will be. Therefore, not
18
only are consumer-oriented retail uses to be preferred
where an interesting street space is desired, but
Geist frontages should be shorter. (Note that stores typi-
cally have only one entrance for security reasons.)
Two incidental conclusions can be inferred.
One, it makes no sense to push retail uses back from
the sidewalk edge. By their nature, businesses seek
to extend into the street. In so doing, they enliven
the street. It would be better to use the model of
Asian suqs and bazaars where most business is con-
ducted in the margin between the building facade and
the traveled way.
Second, the dominant prototype of the street
section (derived from residential planning?) is con-
trary to the desirable retail form. The margin
between residential room and street edge is occupied
by at least ten devices, all intended to provide
Clay privacy for the resident. The term "margin" (in the
Habraken 1976 same sense as Habraken uses it) has become synonomous
with "transition zone" and is erroneously associated
with "buffer", a traditional planning term. (Conven-
tional planning and zoning differentiate uses,
separate dissimilar ones, and seek to buffer incom-
patible ones. It is a dubious model the primary
19
virtue of which is its intellectual simplicity.) Lynch 1981
It is conceivable that the margin, even when
void of retail activities, could be designed to pro-
vide a richness of interesting detail comparable to
that of the retail street. The Gothic church with its
intense figurative articulation is perhaps an extreme
example. Boston's Beacon Hill, with its fine grain of
pavement and wall detail, is another. Even relatively
suburban residential areas, heir to the English
domestic gardening tradition (e.g., Victoria, British
Columbia; or Nantucket, Massachusetts), provide a
wealth of attractive detail that enlivens the street-
scape.
In general, a glass wall is preferred to a solid
one, a view with activity to a dead one, and openings
to continuous enclosure.
5., _acant E, azas. Plazas, often the source of floor area
bonuses, have been favored on the erroneous assumption that
more space equalled more public activity and therefore a more
satisfying urban environment. William Whytes's studies seem to whyte
prove the exact opposite, up to a point. Personal interaction
is most intense in the densest pedestrian flow--thus violating
intuition. People seek out busy places, at least in part,
because they are there to look at other people.
20
Limitations .of j~b Model Ed Critige
J. Jacobs In its broadest outline, Jane Jacobs' book was a critique
of large-scale urban renewal in the Corbusian and Bauhaus
traditions. Jacobs celebrated the physically bounded and
socially tight-knit urban forms of Greenwich Village, Boston's
North End, and San Francisco's North Beach.
Jacobs failed to note the close interaction between
culture and place. It seems no small coincidence that all
three of Jacobs' favored neighborhoods were working class and
traditionally Italian. On a hot summer night, the casual
visitor to the North End observes people clustered on lawn
chairs in front of open doors, sometimes even with a television
set at hand. There appears to be considerable socializing
among neighbors. Beacon Hill--not a mile away--has a similar
urban form, yet not only is such social behavior absent but it
is unthinkable.
Perhaps more gravely, commentators failed to recognize the
critical role of tenure in behavior observed in the urban
environment. One of the seminal idea's of Jacob's book was the
concept of "mixed use". Until her book, the strict segregation
of land uses was a hallmark of urban planning. Jacobs argued
that the vitality and security of the street was a function of
the number of people who inhabited it and watched over it.
Through the process of intellectual osmosis that characterizes
the dispersal of new ideas in our culture, the term "mixed-use"
took hold in the popular vocabulary and became canon in the
planner's stock of models. Because mixed-use developments had
to be shoe-horned into the traditional "Euclidean" (use-
separated) zoning structure, the new use category, mixed-use,
was enacted with sufficient procedural and performance
standards to insure that adverse impacts did not result. In
other words, a mixture of uses was permitted in a building
complex on a single parcel if certain conditions were met. At
its most extreme, Boston's Copley Place resulted.
The example of Copley Place raises two critical issues.
First, although it mixes uses, do Jacobs' wishes for urban
qualities obtain? Second, what happens over time as markets
shift? (This second question is no small matter in the case of
Copley Place. The success of the entire project is dependant
of the success of the individual store. A vacancy not only
means lost income from one business, but also a smaller overall
clientele for the entire complex.) Clearly, the answer to the
first question is "no" on two accounts: the residential por-
tions of the project face away from the hotel/shopping/office
complex and have no functional relationship to it; and the
perimeter of the complex (with the possible exception of the
residential units) deadens the surrounding streets.
One can speculate about the second question, since there
Witherspoon, Abbett and Gladstone
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is little precedent to guide one's judgement. The advent of
vacant shopping centers in the suburbs offers a pessimistic
vision. It seems evident, however, that both the physical and
legal nature of the complex is highly specialized and offers
little latitude for alteration. The hotels might be converted
to housing; offices probably must remain offices (a pertinent
speculation); and any contraction of the shopping mall probably
would mean complete reorganization or even abandonment of the
use. Legally, change is constrained by the nature of the
developer's land lease and in turn the leases of the individual
tenants.
Elsewhere, where structure and ownership are contiguous
with one or a few tenancies, change can occur in a piecemeal
fashion (more closely following free-market models). The
dynamic interdependency of uses still obtains, but a con-
tracting market means gradual decline rather than sudden col-
lapse as in the case of the large complex.
Current Responses to the Critigue
One might say that the street is a street by courtesy
Rudovsky of the buildings that line it.
There exists a vast array of techniques for the implemen-
tati on of urban design policies. Jonathan Barnett, in his
Barnett ID AU _-lggi, treats over one dozen. The
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arsenal has expanded since the mid-1960's as two cities--New
York and San Francisco--have fitfully sought to implement the
townscape model in their central business districts. The
history of office building regulation in both cities, particu-
larly in New York, is an illuminating recap of the evolution of
urban design thinking.
There are three basic forms of high density office devel-
opment. The earliest was the "block", a building that com-
pletely covered a parcel (except for service alleys). Its
walls toed the property lines and rose vertically to its full
height. Setbacks or indentations were provided only as neces-
sary for daylighting and ventilation. The classic example of
this type is the Equitable Building (120 Broadway, New York).
The AT&T building is recent case.
The second type is the tower on a base or podium. The
Empire State Building is the most famous example. A solid
five-story horizontal block supports the tower whose setbacks
and indentations emphasize its verticality. In its most
extreme form, the tower-on-base has such a variety of setbacks
that it is labelled "wedding cake" or "ziggurat".
The third form is the tower in plaza. The form is thought
to have its origins in Le Corbusier's Radiant City, but it was
first popularized in this country by the Seagram Building. It
quickly became the model for the corporate landmark. The new
24
New York Department of City Planning
Barnett
A. Jacobs
Rockefeller Center buildings on New York's Avenue of the
Americas are the most notorious example of this type.
Each type is reflected in the evolution of the New York
City Zoning Ordinance, the model for all central business
district regulations in the U.S. The 1916 ordinance reacted to
the way the Equitable Building cast the street into darkness:
instead, it promoted the wedding cake. In 1961, the tower-on-
base was abandoned in favor of the tower-in-plaza, both for
reasons of fashion and amenity: although many plazas proved
useless or even unpleasant, it was felt that Manhattan could
use whatever open space it could get. Finally, the 1981 Mid-
town zoning proposal revived the wedding cake for reasons of
scale, daylighting, and new models of urban plazas and parks.
Since the mid-sixties, in fact, the development of down-
town design concepts has been largely a dialogue between New
York and San Francisco. New York's 1961 zoning was distin-
guished by, among other things, the introduction of floor-area
ratio as a bulk restriction. For the first time also, bonuses
were offered as an incentive to provide plazas and arcades.
San Francisco followed with broader bonuses in 1966, and then
with an urban design plan for the entire city in 1971. San
Francisco's innovations included restrictions on building
shape: not only were height and bulk restricted but the
diagonal dimension was also limited.
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The next moves were New York's. In a series of amendments
to the 1961 ordinance, special districts were created to re-
spond to problems unique to areas like the theater district,
Lincoln Center, Fifth Avenue, Greenwich Street, and Lower
Manhattan. Various features and amenities were either required
or encouraged with FAR bonuses. Street walls were to be ex-
tended with "build-to" lines. Heavily trafficked sidewalks
were to be expanded with arcades, galleries, underground con-
courses, loggias, plazas, and pedestrian bridges. Street-level
spaces were reserved for specified retail uses (banks and
airline ticket offices were excluded because they were
"boring"), and the retail frontages could not be broken with
building entrances.
As the 1961 ordinance was amended, regulation became more
discretionary and negotiable. Both developers and citizens
became leery of the unpredictable development process--a
reaction came in 1979 with publication of the Battery Park City
design guidelines. (See case study.) The 1981 Midtown zoning
regulations completely revamped the use, bulk, and bonus regu-
lations and all but eliminated discretionary review and nego-
tiation. Many of the features of the special districts were
retained: required street walls (minima and maxima) with set-
backs above, retail continuity, restricted retail uses, and
various pedestrian improvements. Curb cuts were prohibited on
Cooper 1979
New York Department of City Planning
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avenues and major streets. The most significant innovations
were designed to protect the light and openness of public
streets and adjacent buildings. Developers could design their
buildings under either of two systems: the daylight compensa-
tion tier or the performance tier. The first was a new version
of the 1916 building envelope with progressive setbacks above
the street wall. The second used the Daylight Evaluation
(Waldram) Chart to determine the exact portion of the sky vault
that was blocked from the sight of pedestrians at two points on
the centerline of the fronting street.
Thus far, the new ordinance regulated building use and
massing. The only regulation of actual design was a require-
ment that on Fifth Avenue a minimum of 20% of the facade up to
85 feet in height be in light colored masonry. More specific
design regulations were included in Cooper Eckstut's proposals
Cooper Eckstut for Rector Place in 1981. Street walls were again required;
the first two stories had to be finished in light colored
masonry; "expression lines" (e.g., cornices) must appear in a
band 60 to 80 feet above ground and again between 110 and 135
feet; and the top stories should be richly sculpted with major
recesses, balconies and setbacks. It was a deliberate attempt
to recreate the form of such Manhattan neighborhoods as
Gramercy Park, Park Avenue, Riverside Drive, West End Avenue,
East End Avenue, and Tudor City. Their general intent is
27
stated in one declaration: "Street walls are the most
important tool for preventing any one building from dominating
others." Similarly, "the stone base provides continuity, a
human scale, and also decorates and dignifies the street where
people are walking." The expression lines "reduce the scale of
the street wall by suggesting heights of lower buildings on the
adjacent side streets." And finally, "a varied and highly
sculptured skyline seen from the water would be a significant
addition to Battery Park City's image and appropriately consis-
tent with the current skyline of Lower Manhattan."
Rector Place is a residential development but many of its
design features were adapted in the next go-around in the bi-
coastal urban design exchange. The 1983 San Francisco Downtown
Plan would apply similar controls through the mechanisms of
zoning and design review. Changes encompass height and bulk,
the separation of buildings, sunlight access, wind protection,
building appearance, and the relationship of buildings to the
street. Like the New York regulations, a street wall (1.25
times street width or 50 feet, whichever is more) is
encouraged, if not required. A cornice is required at the same
height whatever the form of the wall. Buildings are to taper,
either continously or in steps, but actual dimensions are
specified only at lot lines. Sculptured tops are encouraged.
The figure is one possible form and seemingly the one preferred
San Francisco Department of City
Planning 1983(a)
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by San Francisco's urban designers. Certain aspects of
building appearance--including a continuous street wall with
setbacks above and continuity of retail frontages--are also
encouraged through the design review process.
Like the New York regulations, the San Francisco plan
would regulate building form to protect light at street level.
Where New York protects daylight, San Francisco would protect
sunlight falling on designated open spaces and sidewalks at
specified times of the year and day. Height and bulk regu-
lations protect open spaces; tabulated sun access angles pro-
tect sidewalks; and a few specified sites require additional
shadow studies.
The primary concern of the San Francisco plan is the
preservation of the city's aesthetic qualities. The appearance
of the downtown area is addressed from three perspectives: the
streetscape where building mass dominates the scene and affects
light and air; from down a street or from upper floors of other
buildings where mass can obscure views; and at a distance where
height and bulk affect the image of the skyline. These three
vantage points correspond to three parts of building form:
base, shaft or tower, and upper tower or top. The proposed
regulations in turn correspond to the form of each.
Proposals for Boston's central business district would
reflect the momentum towards the regulation of building form
30
Greater Boston for aesthetic as well as functional reasons. The Development
Guidance Project identified four "immutable values" to be pro-
tected: access to light and sun, usable open space, views and
vistas, and waterfront and public pedestrian access. It pro-
posed performance standards for a list of 19 items, among them:
" sunlight and daylighting
" street-level wind protection
" views and view corridors
" open space requirements
" street-level activity
* provision of public amenities
" physical relationship of the building to the street
" district character and scale
" use mix
" sense of connection to the past
" relationship to natural features
" water access and views
There are a few elements common to the New York and San
Francisco examples. (Boston, seemingly, would like to expand
the set.) Both are primarily concerned with the form and
quality of the public space (i.e., the street and plaza).
Height, bulk, and setback regulations control the form of the
street edge. (If either city presages future trends, we may
expect to see street walls extending to the horizon.) Both
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encourage or mandate retail frontage. Both seek to protect
daylight or sunlight in public spaces. The San Francisco
regulations and the Battery Park City guidelines (but not the
Midtown regulations) seek to sculpt the skyline.
Possible Additional Responses jtD Jh Critique
Thus far, we have noted two responses to the townscape
model. First is the mixed-use development, which, like Jane
Jacobs, rejects the single use district, but, unlike Jacobs,
encourages coarsening the urban grain. The second is the
efforts of New York and San Francisco to mold the form of
development through regulation. There is a third method,
street-mapping and parcelization, that has received much less
attention but that is potentially more potent.
2.i~stnDce of lbg2 laD. The "law of the persistance of
the plan" has often been remarked, most persuasively by Pierre
Lavedan:
Le plan primitif d'une ville ne peut se modifier
que par addition ou suppression de rues. Les
additions sont des operations couteuses, rares, qui
ne peuvent s'effectuer sans laisser de trace. Elles
ne risquent pas de passer inaperques. Les suppres-
sions se font subrepticement, du moins leurs auteurs
le souhaiteraient. Elles sont dues a des
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propristaires riverains de la voie publique. Mais si
elles sont trop fortes, elles entrainent des
protestations et seuls les corps puissants
(politiques, religieux, universitaires) pariennent a
les maintenir: du moins ne passent-elles pas
inaperques. Si elles sont legeres et partielles,
elles ne modifient pas suffisamment le plan pour
qu'on ne puisse pas les reconnaitre a premiere vue.
En d'autres termes, toute ville, laissee a
A
elle meme, conserve le plan sur lequel elle s'est
Lavedan elevee .
In other words, the plan, once laid out and formalized by
deed, is largely immutable. Disasters--devastating earth-
quakes, fires, wars--are opportunities for reorganization of
cities but are more often followed by reconstruction of old
patterns. Examples include the Lisbon earthquake, the great
fire of London (after which Wren's plan was ignored), the 1906
earthquake and fire in San Francisco (after which Burnham's
plan was ignored), and many cities in post-World War II Europe
and Japan. Two reasons are typically cited for the endurance
of the plan: patterns of ownership are unchanged, and substan-
tial investments in underground infrastructure often remain
Branch intact.
Kappjjg. At one time the "official map" was an integral
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part of a city's planning arsenal. It indicated future rights-
of-way, prevented development, and indicated the city's inten-
tion to acquire the land as traffic required new roads. For
fiscal reasons, the official map has given way to road patterns
initiated by developers. No longer is the city committed to
spending its own strained resources. The city relies on a
generalized circulation diagram and various development stan-
dards (usually contained in the subdivision ordinance) to
create a continuous road network while the developer dedicates
the land and pays for the improvements.
(Note that the change may reflect the declining influence
of land developers on local government. Lynch observes con-
cerning 19th century Boston: "...large public subsidies went
into the extension of streets and utilities, which made raw
land saleable. For a time, street improvements made up half
the city budget.") Lynch 1981
At the site planning scale, the patterns of circulation
and parcelization represent significant constraints to building
form. The width and spacing of streets determines the maximum
area and dimensions of parcels. The shape of parcels and
relationships to major and minor streets affect the location of
entrances and service docks. If the urban designer has a clear
understanding of the form and structure of the building type in
question, it should be possible to force certain architectural
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Lynch 1981
Lynch 1958
Anderson
Stichting Architecten Research 1973
Olmsted and Croes
decisions to achieve design objectives. For example, if
economics dictate that office buildings cover at least 25,000
square feet, a 25,000 square foot parcel size will guarantee
that buildings are not set back from property lines. Lynch
suggests: "The coarse grain of development may deliberately be
resisted by dividing land into small parcels, by releasing it
slowly or in fragments, or even by prohibiting large-scale
integrated projects." As long as use and building technology
remain fairly stable, the street pattern should exercise the
same effect.
Ada_.ability. We have already discussed the economic
viability of large-scale, integrated complexes, such as Copley
Place. We should also ask whether a plan, once established,
will sustain its formal qualities as use and technology change.
(The term "plan", as used here, is synonymous with street map.)
Stanford Anderson has observed a "robustness" in the street
pattern of Savannah, Georgia, that has enabled the city to
retain various qualities even as it has changed. He suggests
that the plan offers "information" that allows a predictable
and limited set of responses. The theory is similar to
the concept of "urban tissues".
Olmsted indirectly supports the argument in his classic
condemnation of the grid. He states that a uniform street
pattern severely limits the range of building types that a city
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can accommodate. Moveover, the grid limits possibilities for
"non-thematic" (Habraken's term) or monumental sitings. (See
the Battery Park City case study for an opposing view.)
Curren Theory ad Practice
There is a growing body of both theory and practice in the
area of street-mapping and parcelization. Beginning in 1973,
the Stichting Architecten Research (SAR) of Holland has
developed and applied the concept of "urban tissues" that
encompasses both fixed dimensions of streets and parcels and
rules for the location of structures in the resulting buildable
land. In 1978, Stanford Anderson published an article on
patterns of streets, parcels and built form in (among other
places) Paris and Savannah. In 1980, Leslie Gould, a student
of Allan Jacobs at Berkeley, analyzed the relationship of
parcel size and the grain of the streetscape in downtown San
Francisco. Donald Appleyard and Allan Jacobs issued a mani-
festo in 1982 that included, among five elements essential to
the city, "many, many different buildings and spaces with
complex arrangements and relationships": "...smaller buildings
are a lot more likely if parcel sizes are small than if they
are large." Finally, in 1983 Anne Vernez-Moudon published two
articles that presented a more careful (and less polemical)
analysis of the interrelationships of block dimensions, parcel
Stichting Architecten Research 1973,
1977
Anderson
Gould
Appleyard and Jacobs
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Kriken
sizes, building types and construction technology.
John Lund Kriken presents an impressive array of projects
in which limited parcel size was a fundamental element of the
urban design concept. In a 1983 article titled, tellingly,
"What's Wrong with Small Projects?", he recounts the experience
of Skidmore Owings and Merrill with the Irvine (California)
town center, the Sacramento Capitol Area Plan, and San
Francisco's Yerba Buena Center. In a conversation with the
author, he added two pending projects--Houston's Greenway Plaza
and the Silicon Valley Financial Center in San Jose. All are
characterized by the careful fit of program and parcel size.
In reference to the Irvine plan, Kriken notes: "(The 180 by
180 foot) parcel size was deemed adequate for all contemplated
uses--office, commercial, hotel and parking. As these
buildings fit tightly within the parcel framework, collectively
they can define and enclose park and street open space."
(Incidentally, the evolution of the Capital Area Plan is
an intriguing capsule history of recent urban design fashion.
Rai Okamoto first proposed a superblock scheme for the area.
Sim Van Der Ryn next contemplated a megastructure. Finally,
SOM sought to control the grain of development by dividing the
area into quarter-block parcels. The parallels with the
history of Battery Park City are striking.)
Thesis
Primarily to control the scope of the thesis, the analysis
and projections emphasize the "persistent" elements of the
plan: street and block patterns and parcelization. The fol-
lowing chapters analyze the expected use and building types
(office, convenience retail and parking). The site plan seeks
to implement the townscape model through the manipulation of
the persistent elements. Finally, a projection gauges the
effectiveness of the plan.
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Ill. Use and Building Types
It is assumed that the site will be developed with offices
and supporting retail and parking. This chapter analyzes each
of the three types in order to identify forms and dimensions
that are critical to decisions on street patterns, blocks, and
parcelization.
Offices
There is a basic distinction between office buildings
built for specific clients and those built for the speculative
market. In the former case, the client's requirements are
peculiar and definable; in the latter, the client user is
unknown until well into the construction phase, if then. This
thesis concens itself with the speculative market.
There has, in fact, been some blurring of the boundaries
between the two classes of office building. One sees examples
where an insurance company, for example, is both an equity
investor and prime tenant in a building developed by another
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firm. In these cases, the building is designed with the flexi-
bility required by the speculative market. Should the tenant
later move, its investment retains its competititve value.
In the case of pre-leasing (generally required for per-
manent financing) major tenants are known before construction
is completed. There may be opportunities to customize the
structure, shell, and mechanical systems to a particular
tenant's requirements. In any case, interior work is not
undertaken until the lease is signed. A "work letter" is
appended to the lease specifying work to be completed by the
landlord. It generally includes partitions and wall finishes,
floor finishes, and ceilings (including lighting, secondary
ductwork, etc.).
Despite this flexibility, the speculative office building
is a highly standardized product. In its short, 100-year
history, the office building has had only two basic typologies.
The pre-World War II building had natural lighting and ventila-
tion and was generally shallow in section. Following World War
II, the office building became much bulkier with the advent of
fluorescent lighting and central heating, ventilation and air
conditioning. It has been suggested that various factors--such
as daylighting, increased use of micro-computers, and worker's
desire for a view from their workspaces--will require a new
typology, but there is no evidence thus far that the specula-
,O ,,P,
tive market is going to respond. The conservative investor is
unwilling to risk higher capital costs for an uncertain rent
premium.
BpAsg RjDjng. The debate that raged during the 1960's
and 1970's over the relative merits of the open plan office
("buerolandschaft" or office landscape) and the enclosed office
has been resolved in favor of a mix of the two. The open plan
is favored where privacy doesn't preclude it. It is more space
efficient, and the "office systems" are depreciable as equip-
ment instead of capital. Flexibility is purchased at a some-
what high initial cost since partitions may be covered by the
work letter while office systems are not. But reorganizations
do not require costly alterations to the ceilings, lighting,
ductwork, etc., implying lower long-term costs. It is esti-
mated that over 65% of all office planning is now open-plan.
ElgD Nodul2- The plan module is the basic unit of office
design. All systems are coordinated with it, including floors,
ceilings (including lighting, ducts, sprinklers, etc.), window
mullions, and the dimensions of workspaces, partitions, and
furniture systems. Various modules have been employed, but
practice has largely settled on a five-foot square as the basic
unit. The U.S. Public Buildings Service, which builds about 1%
of the nation's annual office space, requires it.
L3.Ey . A bay is the space between the centerlines of
Wagner
Puigram and Stonis
SModule
Boy
Puigram and Stonis
Saphier
U.S. Public Buildings Service
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two adjacent rows of columns. It is a structural unit, but it
is also the rental unit; leases generally cover one or more
bays.
The bay size is always a multiple of the plan module. A
small bay locates columns inconveniently close to one another,
while a large bay requires deep beams that are both inefficient
and costly. In contemporary speculative office buildings, bay
sizes are almost invariably 25 or 30 feet square. In a survey
of 19 new office buildings in the Boston area, eight employed
the 30-foot bay, six the 25-foot, and five used rectangular
bays or tube construction. The 30-foot bay is preferred where
parking is located under an office building since it is com-
patible with the typical 60-foot parking bay.
qlilding Form. The preferred building form is rectangu-
lar, since it simplifies the layout of workspaces. Polygonal
formnis have been popular in suburban locations where ample sites
do not constrain planning; they may reduce the ratio of peri-
meter to floor area, but their main value seems to be to add
interest to a standard product. (The building illustrated is
at New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts;
Eduardo Catalano, architect.) Circular forms complicate space
planning and are rarely used except where the client wants a
distinctive image. In virtually all forms, however, the bay
module is retained except at the perimeter where, for example,
a square corner may be chamferred.
There has been much analysis of the relative virtues of
square versus elongated forms. The square minimizes the ratio
of perimeter to floor area and generally minimizes the cost of
the building skin. It may also reduce heat gain and loss. The
elongated form (where the building length is about three times
the width) maximizes the space with windows and generally
yields higher rents. Most contemporary buildings compromise
with a rectangular form where the length is about twice the
width. The two-to-one form also usually provides the largest
dimensions in two directions and permits more flexible space
planning.
Core Location. The "core" is the aggregate of all verti-
cal systems (elevators and elevator landings, egress stairs and
landings, pipes and ductwork) and the rooms that are associated
with them (mechanical rooms and bathrooms). Where it is en-
cased in concrete or concrete block, the core may become a
shear wall and provide bracing against lateral forces (wind and
earthquake).
There are four general locations for the core: in two
pieces at each end of the building, along the side, concen-
trated in the middle, or scattered in the middle. The first
and second have been preferred where large dimensions are
required for uninterrupted work areas. For a while, they were
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associated with the open plan office, since they lent them-
selves to a highly efficient circulation pattern within the
floor. However, where tenants occupied multiple floors, the
increased distance from work station to core more than offset
any intra-floor efficiencies. In addition, placement of the
core at the end or side of the building reduced valuable peri-
meter space. For these reasons, it is rare today to see cores
at the edges of speculative office buildings. In custom
buildings they may be used as much for the expressive value of
their vertical lines as for any functional reasons.
A critical factor in the placement of the core is the
maximum distance between work station and egress stair allowed
by the building code. The Building Officials and Code Adminis-
trators International (BOCA) code - basis for the Massachusetts
code - limits the distance to 200 feet for unsprinklered spaces
and 300 feet for sprinklered. In a sprawling building, it may
be necessary to split the egress stairs away from the cores to
achieve the required distance. The scattered core form is
found mostly in the suburbs where large floor areas are more
economical and where low buildings heights make it possible to
use stairs for vertical circulation. It must be recognized,
however, that the building code requires that at least two
egress stairs be accessible by public corridors from each
tenant's space. The more scattered the stairs, the longer the
-- -
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corridors, and the less usable office space there is. Harris
Bathrooms, mechanical rooms and various shafts may also be
scattered, but as with egress stairs, bathrooms require public
circulation. Elevators are always centrally grouped so that
the passenger has immediate access to all of them.
El29g Alga. The measurement of floor areas varies from
city to city. The most widely accepted standard is that
adopted by the Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA)
in 1981. The standard distinguishes three areas: the usable
area, the rentable area and the construction area. The ter-
minology ends confusion over various interpretations of the
terms net usable area, gross and net rentable area, and gross
and net building area. The usable area is the area actually
available for an individual tenant's use and is measured from
windows, the inside of corridor partitions and the centerline
of partitions between tenancies. The rentable area is the
usable area plus public corridors (and intervening partitions)
and all core areas except vertical penetrations and stair
landings. In multiple tenancies, leases cover the usable area
plus a proportionate share of the common rentable area. The
construction area is the entire area of a floor (including
vertical penetrations) measured at the outside building walls.
Only usable and rentable areas are used in leases. The con-
struction area is used in estimating building costs and in
zoning where it governs floor-area ratios and parking require-
ments.
Ratios of usable to rentable area and rentable to con-
struction area measure the relative efficiencies of different
building plans. In general, the higher the ratios, the greater
will be the return on assets. In practice, the ratio of
rentable area to construction area should be about 85% and the
ratio of usable to rentable area should be a similar figure
(i.e., usable to construction equals 72%). (One reference pro-
poses another rule of thumb: usable to construction equals
80%.) The 85% ratio of usable to rentable space applies even
on single tenant floors where the remaining 15% measures the
area of primary circulation.
Within the usable area, one is in the domain of the space
planner. The usable area comprises the actual area required by
work stations (desks, chairs, filing cabinets, conference
rooms, copy rooms, lunch rooms, storage, etc.) plus (again) a
15% factor for secondary circulation. Individual work areas
may vary from 40 to 300 or more square feet, but these figures
are a poor guide to the overall density of workers in a
building or office district since they represent only one-half
to two-thirds of the space the building actually occupies.
Figures for average rentable area or construction area per
employee are more useful. Table III-1 compares averages for
Pulgram and Stonis
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Saphier
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Boston and the U.S. over a period of years and may indicate a
trend towards increased space per employee. These figures are
averages for all office buildings regardless of age or size and
are probably a good indicator of changes at the margin. If one
can assume that the great majority of space remains unchanged
from year to year, major shifts must occur in new construction
for there to be even minor shifts in the averages. Therefore,
new construction must be much larger than average for the
averages to rise. Nevertheless, in conversations with this
author, in-house corporate space planners indicate that
averages are, if anything, falling. (The informants are with a
major electronics firm and a major bank, both in the Boston
area.) They note increased use of minimal office systems with
partitions no larger than necessary to support desks. In one
recent office renovation the average construction area per
employee was barely above 100 square feet. Table 111-2 com-
paries j;;igga U.S. buildings over five years; it provides
additional evidence that the area per employee may be stable.
The open plan office has generated a paradox for space
planning. Privacy and noise control are the primary con-
straints to employment of the system. Sound flies over low
partitions and relects off the ceiling into other work areas.
Sound absorbing materials are used in floors, partitions and
ceilings to reduce background noise but they may have the
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curious effect of making individual conversations more audible
at close range. To insure a minimum level of privacy, space
planners propose that there be a minimum density of employees
(i.e., maximum area per employee) and a minimum number of
employees in each work area. Sufficient background noise will
drown out individual conversations. Pile suggests a maximum of
125 square feet per employee (usable area less circulation).
Palmer and Lewis propose a minimum of about 100 workplaces and
a maximum of about 500. At least one reference prescribes
sound masking systems (i.e., "white noise") as a matter of
course.
Table III-1 shows the average rentable area per tenant in
Boston and the U.S. as a whole. The literature focusses on
major corporate tenants, but the average office tenant is
surprisingly small. Thus, an office building with 30,000
square feet per floor may have four tenants per floor. The
typical tenant will vary from market to market. "Some of these
areas are headquarter locations and some are regional or branch
office locations. This affects the leasing plan which in turn
affects the architectural design with respect to office depths,
corridor widths, parking, etc." Both Tables III-1 and 111-2
imply increasing average floor areas per tenant. (Note that
the Boston samples are small and may not be representative.)
O'Mara
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Table III-1
Average Rentable Area Per Tenant and Average Office Rentable
Area Per Employee (square feet)
Boston U.S.
Office Area
Office /Employee Retail
11,156
14,414
21,974
11,685
13,135
172.9
211.9
213.4
262.3
227.8
216.0
2,472
2,817
2,629
3,494
2,789
Office Area
Office /Employee Retail
4,647
5,110
5,717
5,701
7,907
151.6
187.2
195.7
214.3
215.6
223.0
2,566
1,826
2,786
2,959
3,369
Source: Building Owners and Managers Association Inter-
national, Experience Exchange Report. Washington, D.C.: BOMA,
1970, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1984.
The construction area of speculative office buildings
ranges from 20,000 to 42,500 square feet. Rare examples are
larger. Smaller buildings are almost invariably much less
efficient except where they avoid the use of elevators and
1969
1976
1977
1978
1980
1983
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central HVAC systems altogether. In a sample of 61 recent
office buildings in the Boston area, floor areas ranged from
7,500 to 53,000 square feet (construction area) and averaged
30,200. Over two-thirds fell in the range 20,000 to 42,500.
In general, the larger floor areas are found in suburban
buildings with two to four stories.
As a rule of thumb, shorter, sprawling buildings are more
efficient than tall, narrow buildings. More corridors reduce
the usable space, but the loss is more than made up for in
reduced perimeter per square foot, reduced elevator and EVAC
shafts, and reduced stairways, restrooms and lobbies. Studies
of actual building experience indicate that energy use is also
lower for sprawling buildings. Thus, capital and operating
costs suggest larger floor areas.
By comparison, marketing considerations usually indicate
smaller areas. The typical speculative office building has a
core to perimeter depth of 40 to 60 feet. The preferred depth
depends entirely on the tenant's space planning practices. The
pure open plan office (buerolandschaft) requires 50 to 60 feet.
On the other hand, a conventional three zone office (15-foot
enclosed office at the perimeter, 10-foot secretarial area, and
five-foot circulation zone around the core) can be compressed
into 30 feet. (Small tenants will require shallower depths.)
Forty feet is the maximum depth that secondary EVAC ducts can
reach from the core without requiring third-level branching.
The 30-foot band inside the perimeter is considered the "prime
rental zone"; closer to the core, space yields lower rents.
Table 111-2
Average Rentable Area Per Office Tenant--Comparison of
Identical Buildings: U.S. 1979-1983 (square feet)
Ic -ok 2=p~ Pe n
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
202
206
234
229
216
8070
8415
9272
9655
9804
Source: Building Owners and Managers Association Inter-
national, Experience Exchange Report. Washington, D.C.: BOMA,
1983.
Before the advent of artificial lighting, architects ap-
plied a rule of thumb that daylighting could illuminate to a
depth of 1.75 times the ceiling height. With high ceilings, a
space could be 25 feet deep. Today, ceilings are generally 8'-
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Canestaro 6" to 9'-0" and daylighting can serve the primary illumination
Waqner
needs of a space 15 to 16 feet deep, which happens to be the
Harris depth of a typical perimeter office. Through a combination of
measures, such as light shelves, higher ceilings (10'-5" to
11'-0") in the perimeter zone, and highly reflective ceiling
materials, daylight can be made to illuminate a deeper area,
but only, obviously, if there are no partitions to block it.
Herein lies a fundamental conflict: daylighting is only effec-
tive in the open plan office but light-reflective materials are
also sound reflective and can aggravate sound problems. This
same problem is one of two reasons why indirect lighting is
rarely used in offices (the other being that indirect lighting
typically requires minimum 10-foot ceilings). All of this
suggests that daylighting may alter elements of fenestration
and interior design, but is unlikely to have any effect on
building depth, at least in the speculative market.
The final limit to space depth is the view out. Numerous
studies have concluded that a view from each work station,
however slight, is an important element of worker satisfaction.
Reasons cited include the rest that a distance vista provides
the eyes, the satisfaction of knowing the outside weather, the
2s'-o ) ability to maintain some semblance of contact with the outside
world, the dynamic qualities of natural light, and pleasure in
B.L. Collins the view itself. Three factors affect views: the size of
window, the distance from window and the presence of inter-
vening partitions. A shallower space will reduce the number of
workers who sit far from windows; it will also reduce the
number of zones and therefore the number of possible inter-
vening partitions. The open plan office is the best provider
of views, but the view is purchased at the expense of privacy.
Here again, it appears that space planning and interior design
may have to deal with the issue, since there is no indication
(from the literature) that increased productivity (if there is
in fact any) will induce employers to pay the higher rent
required by shallower spaces. Common practice seems to sug-
gest that satisfaction of management is all that counts. The
larger floor areas typically occur where "back-office" clerical
workers are numerous.
The area of the core itself typically measures 10 to 15%
of the construction floor area. Low buildings (up to four
stories) may have less; tall buildings typically have more.
New York's World Trade Center has cores measuring 30% of floor
area. The area required by elevators is a complex calculation
of service type, elevator speed, and tenant characteristics.
An initial rule of thumb is one elevator per 50,000 square feet
(total construction area) for buildings with floor areas
greater than 50,000 square feet, otherwise it is one elevator
for each 35,000 square feet. Another source gives the rule of
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thumb in terms of stories:
...three to five floors need two elevators, a 10-
story building needs four elevators, and a 20-story
building needs two banks of four elevators. A 30-
story building needs two banks of eight elevators and
three banks (eight, eight, and four). A separate
service elevator is needed for buildings taller than
O'Mara 20 stories with a top-floor restaurant.
Building and fire codes dictate the size and placement of
rest rooms, corridors, and stairwells. HVAC, smoke evacua-
tion and plumbing govern chases, and mechanical, electrical and
telecommunications systems demand additional closed spaces.
In sum, floor size is a function of a number of factors,
none of which can be forecast with any accuracy before actual
architectural design begins. For urban design purposes, it is
reasonable to assume that few buildings will cover less than
20,000 square feet, that most will average 30,000 and that some
will go as much as 42,500 or higher.
§x-Jun.d _Flagr. In addition to the core, the ground floor
includes lobby space and service facilities. The size of the
lobby is generally larger than strictly necessary for func-
tional purposes. It is, instead, an important marketing tool
for both landlord and tenant. Service facilities include
loading docks, receiving areas, service elevator (in larger
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buildings) or corridor to the core (in smaller buildings), and
garbage storage. The size of the loading facilities is
dictated both by zoning and by the tenant mix. Restaurants and
cafeterias will require additional service space. Unusable
areas on the ground floor vary from about 10% (the core area
of a low building) to 100% for a tall building. Twenty-five to
30% is common. (The illustration shows Point West Place,
Framingham, Mass.; Hines Industrial, developer; Robert A.M.
Stern, architect.)
There is a generic problem in the design of lobbies in
buildings without service elevators. The corridor connecting
the loading dock and the elevator lobby cuts off one corner of
the usable floor area. One quarter to one half of the ground
floor space must be leased as a separate tenancy. Only two
solutions exist. First, there is no loading dock; goods enter
and garbage leaves through the main lobby. Second, the lobby
and service area are on separate levels; this is usually most
feasible where the building is on slope or where there is
parking under the building. Security has become an issue in
many office buildings. The first line of defense is a single,
supervised entrance.
Lil.ing Height. The height of a building is a multiple
of the floor-to-floor heights. The floor-to-floor height is
the sum of the ceiling height (typically 8'-6" to 9'-0") and
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the "floor-ceiling sandwich" (typically 4'-0"); it totals 12'-
6" to 13'-0". (A system using bar joists and a composite slab
has yielded a floor-to-floor dimension of 11'-8" with 8'-8"
ceilings.) Raised floors, used for electrical and telecommuni-
cations wiring, may add another foot. Some have proposed to
reduce ceilings to 8'-0" (the minimum height of exit corri-
dors), but there is no evidence of support for this move. For
the purposes of vertical coordination, a 12'-6" or 13'-0"
module should suffice.
A lower floor-to-floor height will save perimeter costs,
but the capital savings is achieved at increased operating
cost. To reduce plenum depths (i.e., the area between deck and
ceiling), air ducts must be flattened. Since the perimeter to
area ratio increases, greater friction results and more energy
is required to push a given volume of air. Still, it may be
advantagous to squeeze the floors: zoning ordinances sometimes
specify height limits in terms of feet and not stories. A 300-
foot limit, for example, might allow 24 stories at 12'-6" but
25 stories at 12'-0".
In general, the higher a building, the greater importance
there is to lateral forces (wind and earthquake) in the design
and sizing of the structures. There are no discontinuities in
this function, so it does not suggest any appropriate optima
for building height.
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Building and fire codes, on the other hand, distinguish
low-rise from high-rise structures and require the latter to
have additional fire protection systems. These include com-
partmentation (where the building is not sprinklered),
sprinklers in areas where they would otherwise not be required,
smoke control, smoke detection, fire department communication,
public voice communication, voice alarm, emergency telephones,
fire department standpipes, emergency elevator operating proce-
dures, and 24-hour a day staff to monitor all of the above.
Different codes define "high-rise" differently. The Massachu-
setts code gives it as any building greater than 70 feet in
height (measured to the top of the highest rafters). The 70-
foot figure comes from the limited height range of most fire-
fighting equipment. The assumption is that above 70 feet,
safety is to be managed internally. It is no coincidence that
suburban office buildings rarely exceed six stories. (To this
writer's knowledge, only the 14-story Wang Corporate Towers in
Lowell exceed the limit in suburban Boston.)
QeyAtors. The economics of elevators have a lesser in-
fluence on building height. There are basically two types of
elevators: hydraulic and electric. Hydraulic elevators are
most economical for buildings from two to four stories where
they run about 15% less than standard electric types, but above
that the installation cost advantage is reduced. Hydraulic
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elevators are physically limited to a traveled distance of 70
feet, or six stories at 12'-6" to 13'-0" per story. Main-
tenance costs are about the same for both types; the under-
ground piston of the hydraulic type may make it somewhat more
costly. On a per floor basis, there are no diseconomies of
elevator costs, and there may, in fact, be a slight savings in
Means 1983 the marginal cost of each floor added. Once the initial
investment is made to serve a two-story building, it may be
economical to add stories to reduce the average cost per floor
except that (according to the rules of thumb) elevators must be
added for additional stories. Table 111-3 demonstrates one
possible calculation assuming 30,000 square foot floors, an
initial elevator cost of $39,000 for two floors and $13,000 for
each additional floor. For the floor area specified,
buildings of one, two, or five stories would be most economical
in terms of elevator costs. The conclusions would vary with
other floor areas, and will of course have to be balanced with
other cost factors. The example shows elevator costs amounting
to, at most, $1.50 per square foot of building area, less than
2% of total building costs.
A final consideration, applicable only in tall buildings,
is the amount of space occupied by hoistways. Simply, the
space increases as the building rises. The loss in rentable
area is balanced against increased rents from higher offices.
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In very tall buildings, double decked elevators and sky-lobbies
can hold down the core size. (The World Trade Center,
mentioned above, uses sky-lobbies.)
Table 111-3
Elevator Costs
No.
stories
Total
3.0000
30,000
60,000
90,000
1
2
3
4 120,000
5 150,000
6 180,000
Source:
9th ed.
No.
Elevs..
Cost/
Elev..
0
1
0
Total
Cost
Marginal
Cost
0
39,000 39,000
2 52,000 104,000
2 65,000 130,000
2 78,000 156,000
39,000
65,000
26,000
26,000
117,000
3 91,000 273,000
Robert Snow Means Company,
Kingston, Mass.: Means, 1983
eans Systems .Costs 194,
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Office Tenure. Virtually all speculative office space is
Melaniphy leased. There have been experiments with office condominiums,
but they have been found inappropriate for all tenants except
medical-dental. Two factors limit their use: they are in-
flexible over time, and they reduce a firm's borrowing power by
appearing as a liability instead of an expense on the balance
O'Mara sheet.
The BOMA standard, discussed above, reduces ambiguity
about the amount of space a lease covers, but there is still
considerable variation in allowances for improvements, opera-
tions and maintenance, and taxes. The "triple net lease" puts
the burden of all expenses on the tenant, except those covered
by the work letter. This is an incentive for the tenant to
conserve energy, but it relieves the landlord of any inducement
to build an energy-efficient building. The "base year" ap-
proach helps solve this problem: the landlord covers expenses
out of the base rent for the first year, and the tenants pick
up their proportionate share of the increase in subsequent
years. Thus, the landlord has an incentive to keep down
initial and base costs, while the tenants have an incentive to
O'Mara avoid increases,
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Urban design plans often propose retail uses to "activite"
building edges, but with little regard to their feasibility.
The locational requirements of retail uses are simple: except
where an individual shop or group of shops are themselves
traffic generators (i.e., "anchors" or "magnets"), shops seek
locations at the highest concentration of pedestrians (or cars
in suburban settings). The market requirements of the same
uses are less clear. In a conversation with this writer
(January 3, 1985), Cecil Sears of the Urban Land Institute
observed that office park developers think of office workers as
only one component of the market for their retail uses.
It should be recognized that office developers, in
general, are reluctant to get involved with retail uses.
Sources at Boston Properties and Olympia & York, both major
office developers, told this writer that retail uses were not
in their firms' areas of expertise and that they only included
them when required by zoning, development guidelines, or other
regulations. Concerns about security and corporate image,
rightly or wrongly, may also deter developers from including
retail in their projects. Finally, in all U.S. markets except
New York City, retail uses in office buildings yield no greater
rent than offices. (See Table I1I-4.) The source at Olympia &
York, developer of the World Financial Center, demurred, saying
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that the company's-experience in New York City showed no rent
premium for retail. Thus, the developer's only incentive to
include retail is as an amenity to an office leasing program.
PDggAd. Despite these caveats, it is possible to make a
rough estimate of the demand for retail uses in an office
district. Karl B. Radov in the Kendall Square study projected
that "convenience" retail (including food and drink) would
capture five percent of the total payroll in the immediate
market area (i.e., walking distance) or $393 per employee per
year in 1981 dollars. Approximately 35% would be for lunch
sales. At $205 of sales per square foot, each employee would
support about two square feet of retail space. In other words,
given a density of five office employees per 1,000 square feet
of gross building area (a high assumption: see Table III-1),
there would be a ratio of 10 square feet of retail for every
1,000 square feet of offices.
A recent project in Quincy, Massachusetts, replicates
Radov's figures. State Street South includes about 25,000
square feet of retail (including cafeterias) for 12,000
employees or about three million square feet of offices. In
other words, 1,000 square feet of offices support about eight
square feet of retail.
Much higher figures are cited in a study by Lynn Sedway &
Associates for downtown Palo Alto, California. Quoting a 1980
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study by Rubin A. Roca ("Market Research for Shopping Centers",
no further citation), they indicate $600 per employee for food
and $400 for other retail (updated to 1981 dollars).
Table 111-4
Average Rent Per Rentable Square
Boston
Office Retail
1969
1976
1977
1978
1980
1983
5.810
7.885
8.812
9.458
11.175
14.77
4.308
8.484
8.187
9.085
8.510
14.62
Foot: Downtowns (dollars)
U.S.
Of fice Retai,
4.934
6.957
7.401
7.919
9.180
12.70
5.330
7.863
8.463
7.997
7.069
12.88
Note: Retail includes spaces in office buildings only.
Source: Building Owners and Managers Association International,
D b B Washington, D.C. BOMA, 1970,
1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1984.
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The Rouse company is said to project $1,384 per employee
(65% food, 35% retail) for San Francisco's Yerba Buena Center
(1984 dollars). Sedway's own study of downtown San Rafael,
California, indicated $20 per person per week (i.e., approxi-
mately $1,000 per year, 1981 dollars), while the associated
firm of Sedway Cooke Associates used the figure of $1,000 per
employee in its Pleasant Hill (California) BART Station Area
Study. (Personal communication: Thomas Cooke, Sedway Cooke
Associates.)
Thus, all of Radov's figures may be suspect. First, there
seems to be better support for a higher sales figure, about
$1,000 per employee (1981 dollars). Second, of 954 business
surveyed nationally, the median sales were $135 per square foot
ULI 1984 (a) in 1982. Finally, as Table III-1 implies, the average area per
office employee was about 250 square feet (construction area).
Thus, offices should be able to support retail uses in the
ratio of 30 square feet of retail for every 1,000 square feet
of offices, fully triple Radov's estimate.
A study of Boston's central business district provides
Loudon strong support for even higher retail demand. Table 111-5
shows total annual expenditures as high as $1,770 (1982
figures). Office employees alone were yet higher at $2,279 per
year. A conservative estimate for the present purpose would
use the daytime expenditures of financial district employees
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Table 111-5
PROFILE OF AVERAGE ANNUAL EMPLOYEE EXPENDITURES
(1982 Dollars)
Financial District
Purchase Type Employees
Food
Lunch
Dinner
Non-Food
Daytime
Evening
$ 480
$ 420
$ 60
$ 1290
$ 975
$ 315
Total $ 1770
All Boston Proper
Employees
$ 420
$ 360
$ 60
$ 1120
$ 840
$ 280
$ 1540
1Assumes 250 working days per year, an average annual inflation
of seven percent between 1979 and 1982 and an average annual increase in
real income (after inflation) of three percent.
Source: William R. Loudon, LfoWD L _;1922122 St.atgSX ELn.
Apipendix 1;. Economic Narket Research, Q~ =I9.ove Work-Base~d
Retai1 ActiLLity Profile. Prepared for the Boston Redevelopment
Authority. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Center for Transportation Studies, October 1983.
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20 sq.ft. retafl per 1,000 sq.ft. office
($1,395) which, accounting for inflation, would be higher than
Rouse's figures for San Francisco. The same study indicated
average retail sales of $118 per square foot (1982). If one
again assumes 250 square feet per office employee (construction
area) the retail to office ratio would be an astounding 47 per
1000 square feet. The study also determined that only 26% of
all expenditures (30% of daytime expenditures) were food-
related, in line with Radov's estimate.
For preliminary planning purposes, this thesis will assume
an average of 20 square feet of retail for every 1,000 square
feet of offices. In addition to its own requirements, the
development will probably also capture a share of demand of the
existing Boston Wharf properties, since most buildings there
are unsuitable for retail uses. On the other hand, the devel-
opment is likely to suffer fairly substantial leakage to devel-
opment on Piers 1 to 4.
This writer's own observations suggest that the mix of
retail uses indicated in the two studies cited may be too
heavily weighted towards restaurants. A windshield survey of
storefronts in Boston's financial district yielded the fol-
lowing breakdown: food and drink, 30%; banks and other finan-
cial institutions, 10%; all others 60%. Cafeterias and vending
machine areas were necessarily not included and would un-
doubtedly raise the percentage of food and drink establish-
ments. Non-food retail uses--tobacconists, newstands, barbers,
beauty parlors and travel agencies--often occupy internal
space, but the total square footage is minor.
EggE Aid L1j2 219o2. Retail space takes virtually any
form that available space allows it. The ggZer size of uses
that typically locate in office districts range in size from
250 to 6,500 square feet. Similar sizes for food and drink
establishments alone range from 1,050 to 3,750 square feet and
the averages disguise vast ranges within each use type.
One reference suggests that a 28-foot by 28-foot bay size
best fits multiples of typical shop fixtures. Recommended shop
dimensions vary from 15 to 40 feet for fronts, and 20 to 100
feet in depth. Guidelines for the Battery Park City commercial
center specified 30 to 50-foot depths. In general, most retail
uses occupy spaces that are deeper than they are wide, while
the spaces themselves are divided into two zones, the rear one
being used for storage and/or service.
Ceiling heights vary anywhere from 9 to 14 feet, but
typically fall in the 10 to 12-foot range.
Display windows almost invariably touch the property line,
and the margin from there to the door is occupied by door
swings, displays and space for passersby to stop and look.
Non-fast-food restaurants are the only exception: often they
use the margin between property line and door to establish a
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privacy buffer between the street and diners. (Their require-
ments are more analogous to residential uses than to other
retail uses.)
In section, shop fronts have four distinct zones. From
bottom to top, there is a sill (measuring from zero to three
feet in height), the window proper (usually reaching the same
elevation as the doors), transom (sometimes combined with the
window proper), and the fascia (where the sign is placed). The
interior dimension of a show window may be greater than the
window opening.
Parking
The quantity of parking is stated in terms of a "parking
index" which is the ratio of the number of parking spaces to
1,000 square feet of construction area (i.e., gross building
area). The minimum (and sometimes the maximum) parking index
is specified by zoning. Additional spaces may be required by
marketing considerations.
The dimensions of parking stalls are also specified by
zoning. In a building with a 30-foot by 30-foot bay, 90 degree
parking is used and each space measures 10 feet by 20 feet with
a 20-foot aisle. These dimensions are usually more than ade-
quate to meet zoning standards.
Free-standing parking structures may require smaller areas
Window Dimensions
Parking Consultants Council
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for each car. The parking bay may be reduced and stalls may be
narrower. (The parking bay is the sum of the aisle width and
two stall depths.) Allowances must be made for the dimensions
of columns, bracing, and barriers. Right-angle parking is the
most efficient, but angle parking is used where site dimensions
limit the size of the overall structure. Today, most free-
standing garages are built with sloping floors that serve as
both aisle and ramp. A circular down-ramp may also be provided
to ease exit.
It is rarely feasible to bridge directly from the upper
floors of parking structures to offices. First, there is a
mismatch between floor-levels: floor-to-floor heights may be
as little as eight feet in parking structures as compared to
12'-6" to 13'-0" for office buildings. Second, security con-
siderations (in both the parking and office structures)
preclude all but single entrances to each. Only when parking
is directly under or over the building lobby can there be a
direct connection between parking and offices, and then only by
elevator. Even in this instance, security and/or the building
geometry often require one elevator between the garage and
lobby and a second from lobby to office.
Free-standing parking structures are never more than six
or seven stories high. (Mechanical garages were sometimes
higher, but are no longer built.) The costs of meeting
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building codes for high-rise structures is one limit; the other
is the unwillingness of drivers to circle ceaseless ramps to
find parking space.
The theoretical minimum square footage for each car is 250
square feet (stall width times one-half bay width). The rule
of thumb is 350 square feet, which makes allowances for inef-
ficiencies (such as corners, structure, elevators, stairways,
collection booths and idling space). Four hundred square feet
is a generous allowance.
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IV. Site and Context
The site encompasses over 23 acres east of Fort Point
Channel in the South Boston district. It is bounded by Sleeper
Street to the west, Northern Avenue to the north, the New
England Seafood Center on "B" Street to the east, Congress
Street to the south and the Boston Wharf properties to the
southwest. Except for temporary mounds of fill, the site is
flat, ranging in elevation from 16 to 18 feet, Boston City Base
(minus 5.65 NGVD). The western half of the site facing Sleeper
Street is currently used for parking. The Boston Wharf Company
owns a 50-foot wide easement between Pittsburgh Street and the
alley between Farnsworth and Sleeper Streets which it uses for
circulation and parking. The company leases an additional
strip of land at the back of its Stillings Street properties
which it uses as a truck loading area. The remainder of the
site is unused.
The site was originally marsh and mudflats. It was filled
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the 1870's and was Boston Affiliates 1982, 1983
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Haley & Aldrich
later leased to the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad
and then owned by its successor companies, the Penn Central and
Conrail. Its ownership is now subject to dispute. Northern
Avenue and its bridge were constructed in 1907 and 1908.
Subsurface 
-Conditions .i~mL Foundation Feasibility
The site was the subject of a study of subsurface condi-
tions and foundation feasibility by Haley & Aldrich dated
February 4, 1985. From the surface, soils are layered as
follows: 11 to 25 feet of fill, zero to 10 feet of organic
soils, 80 to 120 feet of silty clay (Boston Blue Clay), 5 to 20
feet of glacial till, and bedrock at 120 to 150 feet below
ground surface. Groundwater is probably at eight to 10 feet
below the ground surface. The report suggests the following
foundation systems for various building heights. For buildings
without basements: friction piles for low-rise (1 to 4
stories) and mid-rise up to six stories, end-bearing piles for
medium and high-rise (5 to 9 and 10 plus stories, respective-
ly), and drilled-in caissons for high-rise. For buildings with
basements (generally 3 levels, for reasons of hydrostatic
forces): caissons for low and mid-rise, spread footings for
medium and high-rise, and mats for high-rise. The report
offers the rule of thumb for mat foundations that one foot of
soil removed counterbalances one story of structure height.
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Thus, a mat foundation with three basement levels (e.g., 30
feet) could support a 30-story building.
Contex
The site is the location of a number of new road align-
ments that are either planned or proposed. The new Northern
Avenue alignment would connect the new Northern Avenue Bridge
with the existing Northern Avenue at B Street. Sleeper and
Pittsburgh Streets would be extended through the site to old
Northern Avenue. The proposed Seaport Access Roads (northbound
and southbound) would run north-south through the site from
Congress Street to old Northern Avenue. (The Seaport Access
Roads would provide access to the Third Harbor Tunnel south of
Summer Street.) At the time of this writing, none of the
alignments had been fixed. It is expected that part of the old
Northern Avenue right-of-way will be added to the site when it
is narrowed from 100 to 60 feet.
The surrounding land uses include Our Lady of Good Voyage
Chapel (Roman Catholic) which is actually embedded in the site
along Northern Avenue, Anthony's Pier 4 Restaurant on the
opposite side of Northern, the New England Seafood Center to
the east, the Boston Wharf Company properties to the southwest
(see below), and Victoria Station restaurant and the Neptune
Lobster company on the channel side. Mixed-use development is
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Boston Affiliates 1982, 1983
proposed for Piers 1 to 3 ("Fan Pier") and Pier 4, including
hotels, restaurants, retail, offices, housing, and structured
parking. No plans were available at the time of this writing.
East of the site along Northern Avenue, Commonwealth Pier is
the site of office and exhibition development ("BOSCOM"), and
the same developer (FMR Properties) holds an option on about
three acres on the opposite side of Northern Avenue, where
offices are proposed. The area south of the site is proposed
for the right-of-way of the Third Harbor Tunnel.
Boston Whar
The Boston Wharf Company filled a 1,200 foot wide strip
along the east side of Fort Point Channel from 1836 to 1882.
From 1882 to 1930, the company covered the resulting 33 acres
with 85 warehouse and manufacturing structures and two miles of
railroad spurs. The early buildings were five to seven-story
mill construction. The later buildings were eight to 10-story
first-class fireproof construction. All were enclosed in
brick.
Today, about 3.8 million square feet of space remain in
some 80 buildings. A few warehousing and manufacturing con-
cerns remain. Other uses include the Children's and Computer
Museums, offices, housing, and artists' lofts. Stone and
Webster Engineering recently renovated the eight-story,
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162,000-square-foot office building at 51 Sleeper Street (op-
posite Victoria Station). The Wharf Development Company has
built 63,000 square feet of office space at 303 Congress Street
directly on the channel. Boston Wharf Company recently tore
down two buildings on the east side of Farnworth Street where
it has approval to build a 360-car garage.
The draft environmental impact statement and report for
the Third Harbor Tunnel notes: "...the straightforward brick
buildings still stand as a cohesive unit defined by their
consistent massing, cornice height, placement on the street,
and use of common materials and decorative elements." The
accompanying drawings confirm this assessment: the axonometric
demonstrates the similar size and shape of building mass; the
figure-ground diagram shows placement on the street; and the
street elevations for Summer and Congress Streets indicate
similar (if not uniform) cornice heights.
In addition, the street sections for Summer and Congress
streets, which are the district's two major entrances and cross
streets, show the high degree of spatial enclosure. (A width
to height ratio less than two yields a visually "enclosed"
space insofar as the abutting buildings more than fill the cone
of vision. Note that the ratio is the same as the familiar 30
[or 27] degree angle.) Also, most facades exhibit a tri-
partite organization with a two-story base, variable middle and
80
81
F71 ~ jf - ~North Side
.... Lh F .........
...L............. LJ ...  ....
Congress..S.reet.Elevation
Summer Street Elevation
0 50 100
82
one-story top. This neo-classical formula was the dominant
form of commercial architecture in the decades around 1900,
when the Boston Wharf was built.
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V. Projections
The program is given by the client: There are to be two
to three million square feet of offices in buildings ranging in
size from 100,000 to 400,000 gross square feet plus one large
building of 500,000 to 600,000 gross square feet. Building
footprints range from 18,000 to 25,000 gross square feet.
Parking is provided at the rate of two spaces for each 1,000
gross square feet of offices. In addition, this thesis assumes
20 square feet (gross leasable area) of ground-floor retail
space for each 1,000 gross square feet of offices.
The regulations of the Boston Zoning Ordinance and the
Interim Design Standards for the Inner Harbor (Harborpark) are
ignored in order to permit maximum freedom in design explora-
tions. The projections are realistic and feasible forms for
future development of the site, but they might, in some
instances, require amendment of applicable regulations.
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Ob-iectives
The primary objective of the design projections is to
provide a framework for the development of an imageable element
of the overall urban form. More specifically, the district
should be a memorable and prestigious "address" for office
tenants. For the community at large, new development should
organize what is otherwise an amorphous blank area in the
cognitive map of the city. The area should become an attrac-
tive and satisfying place to work in and to visit.
The second objective derives from the potential for
synergy between development of the study area and redevelopment
of the adjacent Boston Wharf properties. Neither is, in it-
self, large enough to pull the center of gravity of the city's
financial district towards Fort Point Channel. Together, they
might divert the city's attention from Back Bay or the North
Station area much as Kendall Square is doing in Cambridge.
This objective suggests that new development recall the form of
the old: the two pieces will be perceived as a whole. Within
this unifying framework, the three principal streets--Northern
Boulevard, Congress Street, and Summer Street--can maintain
distinctive, if similar, characters. Variations in use,
building type, and construction will cause further variation.
The geometrics of the new roadways will unavoidably increase
the scale of the street space, further distinguishing new from
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old.
The third and final objective is to exploit the variation
possible in the street, pattern and the resulting street space.
South Boston, in general, and the Fort Point Channel area in
particular, have Boston's most extensive rectangular grid
street system. Within this regular pattern, however, notable
variation occurs where, for example, Emerson Street follows the
alignment of South Boston's first, non-rectilinear street or
where the whole grid shifts at Dorchester Street. The curve in
Melcher Street and the turns at the ends of Congress Street
create similar variations within the Fort Point Channel area
itself. The overall grid provides a regular urban form that is
understandable because of its regularity and consistent direc-
tionality. Within that regularity, variations--in the form of
enclosed vistas, unusual lot and building forms, occasional
openings, etc.--provide a unique sense of place. Congress
Street provides a better model for a principal street than
Summer Street since the relentless directionality of the latter
makes it function more as a gateway to the open areas beyond
than a place in itself.
Alternatives
Engineers have advanced one scheme for the new Northern
Avenue alignment and two for the Seaport Access Roads. None
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has been selected as of this writing. The Northern Avenue
alignment (Alternative 1) is virtually a straight line from the
new bridgehead on the west side of the channel to the inter-
section of B Street and the present alignment. The thesis
proposes two alternative alignments. One (Alternative 2) is
further south where the south right-of-way line coincides with
the north property line of the Boston Wharf properties. The
existing easement would be incorporated into the new right-of-
way and two major buildings--the Stone & Webster offices and
the 10-story structure on the west side of Farnsworth Street--
would form part of the new street edge. The other (Alternative
3) swings the alignment further north with bends at Pittsburgh
and B Streets. This alignment would put the parcels on both
sides of the street under the control of a single owner, and
the bend would give prominence to the node at Pittsburgh, which
would be the main access to the Fan Pier and Pier 4 develop-
ments. The alternatives as illustrated include various align-
ments of the Seaport Access roads, combined more or less at
random. Only one of the alternatives (Alternative 3) is
developed in any detail, because of time constraints. It
exhibits concepts that should be applicable to the other alter-
natives.
AltSXDAlily 1. As of this writing, this is the most
likely alternative to be implemented. The Northern Avenue
Alternative I
KLTLF
'i 87
500'0
88
alignment would fall just north of the Boston Wharf Company
easement, leaving a strip of private land about 15 to 20 feet
wide. The southbound Seaport Access road would leave 60 to 100
feet behind the Stillings Street buildings, 25 feet of it in
Boston Wharf ownership and the remainder available for truck
circulation. This alternative yields large parcels of devel-
opable land. Block widths range up to 180 feet across, which
would be deep enough for rectangular buildings sited perpen-
dicular to the street. The 130-foot width along Northern
Avenue would be suitable for square to rectangular buildings
sited with their long sides along the main street. Both dimen-
sions lend themselves to parking structures.
This alternative suffers because the Boston Wharf controls
half the frontage of two principal streets: Northern Avenue
and the southbound Seaport Access Road. The company would
retain the option of converting its easement and access rights
to developable land through some arrangement with the land-
owner. The landowner has leverage because of its control over
strips of land immediately along the rights-of-way, but it
would still be difficult for the landowner to establish an
"address" for its development.
Alternativ 2. Of the three alternatives, this one yields
the largest developable blocks. Dimensions range from about
150 to 200 feet in width. The Boston Wharf Company would yield
(i' 89
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its easement and access rights and use the new streets to
service its development. It buildings would form the south
edge of Northern Avenue and the west edge of the southbound
Seaport Access Road. Unlike in Alternative 1, the landowner
would have no leverage over the form of new development on
Boston Wharf properties.
The block dimensions imply one of two patterns for siting
buildings of the sizes given. First, buildings are sited
perpendicular to the streets with entries presumably at the end
of the blocks and/or facing the inside of the blocks. The
blocks thus become self-contained units of the overall plan.
Alternatively, the blocks are divided lengthwise into parallel
parcels; buildings face the steets. The second is the typical
pattern of the Boston Wharf Properties.
Allarjatij .3. Alternative 3 is studied more fully for
three reasons: (1) the landowner has complete control over the
most important street frontages; (2) the inflected street
pattern closes vistas and focusses attention at the center of
the development; and (3) relatively shallow block depths lend
themselves to an organization of buildings where facades and
entrances face and reinforce the form and imageability of the
street space.
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Descriptio
The plan, based on Alternative 3, makes Northern Boulevard
the spine and focus of the new distrct. Its form recalls that
of Summer and Congress Streets as much as the new uses,
building types, construction technology, and street geometrics
permit. Paired buildings at Sleeper Street create a gateway to
the enlarged Fort Point Channel District. It uses the device
of the enclosed vista, found on Congress Street, to heighten
the sense of the boulevard as a distinctive place. Vistas are
further enclosed by the planted median which, like the mall on
Commonwealth Avenue, reduces the visual scale of the street.
The term "boulevard" is specifically intended to reinforce the
special character of the development and to appropriate some of
the grandeur of Commonwealth Pier beyond.
Etj..t And DjisjSq. The street and alley system yields
blocks with dimensions fixed at multiples of office or parking
bays. Depths are limited to the maximum short dimension of
office or parking structures in order to force the long side
(and therefore the entrance) to face the street. Whereas the
depth is fixed, the length (as well as the height and use) are
flexible. Any length of frontage can be used.
With two exceptions, the streets are aligned to form right
angles at parcel corners. This move is intended to overcome
the reluctance of contemporary designers and builders to
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construct buildings with non-rectangular corners. This is one
means (along with minimum lot depths) to insure that street
walls are built to the property line.
;,Jgj.i~g. The inflection (or bend or "crank") in
Northern Boulevard at Pittsburgh Street introduces a deliberate
discontinuity into what should otherwise be a consistent back-
ground streetscape. Vistas terminate at this point, and the
building forms and uses should change to reinforce this
character. (Analogies elsewhere in Boston are Post Office
Square, the Old State House, and Copley Square.) The church is
retained and, with planting, becomes a pleasant anecdote in the
urban fabric like the Old State House or King's Chapel. The
building opposite the church should distinguish itself in terms
of placement, scale, detail, and materials. (The illustration
is a caricature of the prescribed type: it pulls back from the
street and follows the geometry of the adjacent block instead
of its own. Human scale disappears and details and materials
are scaleless. Ideally, the building would have an atypical
use, some public function perhaps.)
By its very openness the church square opposes the density
of the overall development. Its small size is more in scale
with the church than the surrounding office buildings.
The larger space enclosed by the surrounding buildings is
longer in the north-south direction in order to contrast it
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with Northern Boulevard. It opens towards the piers and the
harbor and joins the office district to the larger landscape.
It is like a visual "bay".
If there is to be a very tall building in the district, it
should stand on the west side of the square. Its height would
mark the district at a distance and the square at the street
scale.
Ala.y The alleys limit the block depths and orient the
buildings, as noted above. In addition, they provide light and
air to the buildings backing onto them. The illustrative site
plan sets their width at 50 feet. The author's own observa-
tions indicate that 40 feet between windows is uncomfortably
claustrophobic. Also, there is the rule that facial expres-
sions are recognizable at 40 feet; thus, greater distances
should protect privacy.
Except in the block bordered by the Seaport Access Roads,
the alleys are used for service and access to parking. (There
should be no curb cuts on Northern Boulevard or Congress
Street.) The remaining block turns inside out. Service and
parking are accommodated on the heavily traveled north-south
roads and the center alley is designed for a pleasant passage
from parking to workplace.
E9lesh 2.gtiqD. The street section includes arcades on
both sides of Northern Boulevard and 34-foot carriage ways in
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Engineer's Proposal
February, 1985
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each direction separated by a 38-foot planted median. The
median is designed to reduce the visual scale of the street
from 112 feet to approximately 40 feet. There is the rule that
faces are recognizable at 80 feet; thus the street would take
on more the intimate scale of Congress Street (with its 75-foot
right-of-way) than Summer Street (at 100 feet).
Another possible street section would place trees in the
sidewalks instead (see alternative section), but the buildings
and small planters would prevent them from growing to full
size. Many of the advantages of enclosure and shelter would be
lost.
The arcade would be a public easement on private property.
It accommodates the necessary sidewalk but minimizes the
distance between buildings. It reduces the street scale. The
alternative--a wider street section--would make the blocks on
the south side of Northern Boulevard all but unbuildable.
The arcade solves a problem endemic to developments with
the coarse grain of office districts: lack of human scale. As
viewed from the passing vehicle, the large buildings present a
coarse grain in keeping with vehicular speed. The arcade, on
the other hand, articulates the foreground and interests the
pedestrian. The arcade also provides protection from rain and
shields pedestrians from wind blowing down building faces.
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.9n.gD.gZZ .5 g. The two blocks facing Congress Street
are shaped like the others in the development: at least as
wide as they are deep. Buildings should face Congress Street
and should extend and reinforce the character of that street.
There should be no arcade on Congress.
Parking. The central block provides the best opportunity
for large, efficient parking structures. The illustrative site
plan places the alley so that two bays of parking can be built
on either side. The same dimension would be suitable for
offices if parking demand is less than assumed. In addition,
about half of the office parcels are big enough for ramps and
underground parking. Foundation analysis indicates that three
underground levels are feasible. On-street parking is assumed
in the street sections.
Qpe S-ace. The square is purposefully small. The nearby
waterfront provides much more attractive open space than the
office district could conceivably supply. Nor should it be
forgotten that streets and alleys supply the most generous
portion of the city's open space. Here, the streets and alleys
are wider than in other parts of downtown Boston or the Fort
Point Channel area. Building coverage in the study areas is
45% as compared to 52% in the Boston Wharf properties
(measured to Necco Court). These figures assume full parcel
coverage. Additional open space will occur in the new district
100
where builders do not use the full lot depth.
.59lbb-uiLd .5ra9il Auaag EgAd. The illustrative site
plan leaves a 25-foot strip of land at the back of the
Stillings Street buildings. The land is currently owned by the
Boston Wharf company and is used for truck loading. It is
reasonable to expect that loading operations will cease some-
time in the future, and the land will become available for
development. The illustrative site plan shows how one building
might be built at the right-of-way line.
Evaluation
The thesis poses the question of whether the pattern of
streets, blocks, and parcels, by themselves, can achieve the
stated design objectives. The illustrative site plan, figure
ground plan, and axonometric show a new district that respects
the form, coverage, grain, and scale of existing development.
The perspective sketches suggest a coherent, positive street
space that is at once memorable and human-scaled: yet, these
diagrams hide potential pitfalls that might frustrate achieve-
ment of the objectives.
KaIt axtall. Should the market for office development
prove weak, would other uses be able to make a positive contri-
bution to the urban form? What if the site sits partially
developed for some years? Gaps might result or another use
101
Figure /Ground
With Projected Development
0 500'
102
might have bulk requirements that are incompatible with the
pattern of blocks and parcelization. Housing, for example,
demands privacy and tends to shrink from the street; it has
specific requirements for usable and passive open space; it
must have direct access to parked cars; and it requires a much
shallower building section than offices. Zoning can limit the
range of permitted uses, but clearly the public (and the land-
owner) is ill served by vacant land.
This thesis does not test another program on the site.
Thus, it is pure speculation to predict the consequences of a
weak market. The Battery Park City case study suggests that a
weak market combined with a rigid plan can block development
entirely. That same case study and the one on Kendall Square
indicate sure death for any project with unusually high up-
front costs. This site plan limits up-front costs to a small
park and a landscaped median, and parcels are generous for most
non-office uses (other than manufacturing or warehousing). The
Northern Boulevard project may weather a weak market, as a
consequence.
Tight phasing is essential to success of the project at
any stage. The first phase should include Northern Boulevard
between the channel and Pittsburgh Street as well as buildings
around the square. These two elements will set the image for
the remainder of the project and might even withstand signifi-
Axonometric
With Projected Development
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Perspective at Pittsburgh Street
Looking East
cant changes elsewhere on the site. Which should come first is
less clear. The square will be the most visible element but
could sit solitary if the remainder of the boulevard is
delayed. Without the square, however, the western leg of
Northern Boulevard will suffer the same weakness as Summer
Street: a visually powerful street develops great momentum,
but culminates in a void.
Lgggng. An essential characteristic of Summer and
Congress Streets is the continuous street wall. Breaks occur
only at intersections and at vacant lots. In the new develop-
ment, builders may decide to set structures back from the
property line where they do not need the full depth or area of
the parcel. From the builder's perspective, such a move would
give greater prominence to the building and, potentially, yield
higher rents. From the urban design perspective, setbacks
would violate the contextual model and the streetscape model
wherein individual buildings are subservient to the street.
Similarly, in a weak market, builders may build too low.
The street would lack the degree of enclosure of Summer or
Congress Streets. Alternatively, towers might yield higher
rents but would overwhelm the street, throw open spaces into
shadow, and aggravate wind conditions.
Additional bulk regulations are required to deal with
these contingencies. Careful phasing would also serve to maxi-
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mize development of each parcel without overwhelming the site.
Misgdisbutjij. D 91 122. There is the danger that
critical street frontage on Northern Boulevard and Congress
Street would be occupied with structures that do not contribute
to the form, character or vitality of the street. Parking
structures are of greatest concern. By design, the block sizes
on both streets are generally too small for efficient parking.
(The one exception is the north side of Northern Boulevard
between Sleeper and Pittsburgh Streets. The illustrative site
plan shows a small, 250-car garage behind and over the arcade.)
Approximately one quarter of the buildable area can be
developed before it is necessary to build parking structures.
In the interim, parking occurs on the remaining vacant land.
If phasing concentrates initial development on the critical
frontages (particularly Northern Boulevard and the square),
opportunities for unsuitable uses should be forestalled.
Even if some parking occurs on Northern Boulevard,
additional guidelines will require a continuous arcade and
retail frontage. At least the pedestrian level will not be
disrupted.
1929O9g&1&22 brcbit2x1. Building elevations may be
either so flamboyant or so bland as to detract from the
coherence of the street. The plan incorporates one feature to
avert this potential problem: most block frontages are long
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enough for two buildings, thus leaving little latitude for a
singular statement. Additional guidelines are necessary to
encourage compatibility of design.
Unlc2292eali 2 .9ln FbAzl Q;ojgAny. The plan, as
illustrated, avoids interference from the Boston Wharf Company.
Only the southbound Seaport Access Road may suffer from incom-
patible moves on the company's part, but the character of that
street is not a particular concern of the plan.
Despite apparent benefits of the illustrative site plan,
it is more likely that the road alignments will leave the
Boston Wharf Company in control of significant frontage.
Existing buildings along this frontage are unified only by
common material. Height, massing, and quality vary radically
from one structure to the other. Gaps occur where continuity
is required. In all cases, buildings present their sides, not
their facades, to Northern Avenue. New development may yield
additional gaps, along with buildings that are out of scale,
inward looking, or otherwise unsupportive of the street form.
The landowner holds critical strips of land along the proposed
right-of-way which it should use as leverage to insure com-
patible form.
Perspective at Sleeper Street Additional Guideline
Looking East Lnd DU. Only the following uses are permitted: office,
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commercial, retail, and parking. Offices shall not exceed
three million square feet in area. There are no limits on
commercial or retail uses. The illustrative plan encourages
retail uses, particularly along Northern Avenue, to lend
interest to the pedestrian experience and to serve the needs of
tenants and visitors. The illustrative site plan indicates
where retail uses are required. (Building entrances shall not
occupy more than one structural bay of the street frontage.)
Banks, brokerage firms and other financial institutions are
excluded from the designated retail frontage because they tend
to deaden the street edge.
There shall be no more than 4,000 parking spaces within
the development area (excluding on-street parking or off-street
loading). There is adequate buildable area along the Seaport
Access Roads for large parking structures. Combined with base-
ments in approximately half the buildings, there would be
enough parking without having parking intrude on the street
frontage of Northern Boulevard or Congress Street.
Phasing. Development shall first occur on parcels facing
Northern Boulevard between Sleeper and Pittsburgh Streets. Two
additional parcels facing the square should also be in the
first phase. Parking structures should only be constructed
when the remaining vacant land is no longer sufficient for
required parking.
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fljjJJS. Each block shall have a continous street wall at
the right-of-way line with a minimum height of six stories and
a maximum of nine. Breaks will be allowed only for required
fire separations and access to loading and parking. The intent
is to replicate the form and the scale of the street space on
Summer and Congress Streets. Buildings shall not exceed ten
stories in height (exclusive of elevator penthouses, water
towers, etc.) except on parcels facing the square where towers
may project above the street wall but must be set back at least
30 feet. Towers shall not be closer than 100 feet to one
another in order to protect views. In no case, however, may
buildings cast shadows on the square or the sidewalks along the
north side of Northern Boulevard from March 21 through
September 21, from 11:00 AM to 2:00 PM (local time). In
general, this requirement will limit buildings along the south
side of Northern Boulevard to six or seven stories.
There are no maximum coverage or minimum open space
requirements. The floor-area ratio is governed by the program,
building heights and (indirectly) parking.
b1;9292g. There shall be a continuous arcade along both
sides of Northern Boulevard except on the parcel on the south
side of the square. The arcade shall have a clear horizontal
dimension of 12 feet and a clear vertical dimension of 20 feet.
f5ldidDS al2ygtiSDg. Except on the parcel on the south
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side of the square, building elevations shall replicate the
tri-partite organization found on Summer and Congress Streets.
There shall be a cornice or marked change in fenestration,
materials, color or texture between the second and third
stories and a similar demarcation between the top and the next-
to-the top story of the street wall. Fenestration shall
emphasize verticality in the intervening stories, but floors
should still be clearly expressed. Flush windows should be
avoided.
All elevations should incorporate a significant amount of
masonry, but other materials such as stone, concrete, terra
cotta and metal may be suitable. Cast iron facades on Congress
Street may serve as references for some new buildings.
Signage. There shall be no projecting signs. On-premise
signs for retail uses may face the street on the outside of the
arcade but shall be recessed at least six inches behind the
column face. Only reflective lighting shall be allowed.
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VI. Conclusions
This thesis hypothesized that the pattern of streets,
blocks, and parcels would be sufficient to achieve certain
postulated design objectives. Among the design objectives were
a clearly defined street space, based on a model of urban form
first proposed by Camillo Sitte and later named "townscape".
Implicit in the argument is the understanding that urban
form is the result not only of site (as abstracted in streets,
blocks, and parcels) but also of use, building type, and
construction technology. Thus, the thesis assumed two building
types which were similar in terms of site requirements:
offices and parking. (Both would accommodate a small amount of
pedestrian-related retail uses without altering their forms.)
A program of offices and parking structures was organized
on a site in the Fort Point Channel area of Boston. The re-
sulting illustrative site plan was evaluated for its success in
achieving the stated design objectives. It was found that
certain circumstances--such as a weak or changeable real estate
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market--might generate another form, and the objectives would
not be met. It followed that a given pattern of streets,
blocks, and parcels was not a sufficient determinant of the
desired urban form. Additional guidelines would be required,
including phasing specifications, land use regulations, bulk
controls, etc.
The case studies which follow attack the hypothesis from
another perspective. Each asks how knowledge of use, building
type, and construction technology informed decisions on the
pattern of streets, blocks, and parcels. The results were
ambiguous at best. At Mission Bay, housing types were studied
for a hypothetical block that appeared nowhere in the plan.
Since nothing has been built, there is no way to determine if
the street pattern in anyway constrains building form. At
Battery Park City and Kendall Square, the central blocks were
generous enough to permit a variety of siting arrangements.
Plans were modified or abandoned as the sites were built.
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Appendix A
Case Study:
Battery Park City, New York
Battery Park City is a 92-acre landfill site in Lower
Manhattan. Development comprising six million square feet of
offices, 14,000 dwelling units, and 150,000 square feet of
retail is being guided by a plan prepared by Cooper Eckstut
Associates in 1979. This case study chronicles the evolution
of the plan and identifies modifications that have occurred
during implementation.
History
Landfill development first appeared in the 1963 plan for
Lower Manhattan sponsored by David Rockefeller. The Department
of Marine and Aviation had proposed pier slips, a hotel, com-
mercial space, and apartments on a 65-acre landfill. Rockefel-
ler's consultants--Skidmore Owings and Merrill--dropped the
piers and proposed commercial development in the form of towers
in open space.
Three years later, Governor Nelson Rockefeller proposed a
Cooper 1979
Benjamin
Rockefeller
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"coordinated community" on 98 acres of fill. The plan,
developed by Wallace K. Harrison, recalls Rockefeller's Empire
State Plaza in Albany: development on two levels with
industry, parking, and vehicular circulation below and major
buildings, parks, and pedestrians above.
Also in 1966, the City Planning Commission and the Down-
town-Lower Manhattan Association jointly produced the Lower
Manhattan Plan. Prepared by the consulting firms of Wallace
McHarg Roberts and Todd, Conklin Rossant, and Alan M. Voorhees,
the plan envisaged a self-centered community or "new town in
town". It was to be a linear city organized around a north-
south spine. Unlike the earlier stillborn plans, the Lower
Manhattan Plan recommended that an agency be formed to carry
out the plan, and in 1968 the Battery Park City Authority came
into being.
Concurrent with the formation of the authority, the urban
design group of the City Planning Department prepared the
Battery Park City Special District regulations to implement the
Lower Manhattan Plan. Zoning and provisions in the authority's
ground leases would govern the use and form of development of
the site. In a departure from the plan's self-contained com-
munity, the regulations attempted to establish continuity
between new development and the existing fabric of Lower Man-
hattan. Selected streets were extended into the site, visual
Wallace McHarg Roberts and Todd, and
Conklin Rossant
Barnett
corridors (comprising rights of way and build-to lines) were
required, and major buildings were required to respond to the
geometries of existing landmarks. An esplanade was to provide
public access along the river with a mix of public and private
uses abutting. One additional element--a pedestrian bridge at
Liberty Street--was required by the new Greenwich Street
Special District.
The 1966 Lower Manhattan Plan was revised for the Battery
Park City area in 1969. A joint city-state venture, the new
plan was sponsored by the city's Office of Lower Manhattan
Development and the new Battery Park City Authority. It was
prepared by three firms: Harrison & Abramovitz, Conklin
Rossant, and Johnson & Burgee. The reappearance of Wallace K.
Harrison signaled a shift back to the large-scale, integrated
development he proposed in Governor Rockefeller's 1966 plan.
The new plan included 19,000 dwelling units with 55,000 resi-
dents. Five million square feet of offices housing 35,000
workers would be organized in clusters or "pods". Housing and
offices would be organized along and on top of a shopping and
circulation spine running the length of the site.
The landfill was proceeding when it was realized that the
1969 plan was overly complex and required excessive front-end
costs. In 1973, the plan was revised by shortening the spine
and simplifying the mixture of uses. Housing was moved into
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"pods", shopping was consolidated into a separate center con-
nected to other buildings, and all office buildings were moved
to the southern end of the site.
The fill was complete in the mid-70's and the foundations
were lain for the first residential complex, Pod III, when
construction was halted. The Battery Park City Authority faced
default if it could not demonstrate that ground rents would
cover infrastructure costs and bond redemption. It could not.
The authority's "moral obligation bonds" were not backed by the
full faith and credit of the state, and the city's fiscal
crisis eroded confidence in all government agencies.
The plan committed the authority to unusually high infra-
structure costs. There had been little effort to use excess
capacity in existing lines, and the project phasing was inef-
ficient. The authority was supposed to be reimbursed by the
financially strapped city. There was no reason to believe that
the authority could generate sufficient revenue to cover any
costs even temporarily. Manhattan was suffering an office glut
and Battery Park City offered the least attractive building
site: the plan put offices far from transit and other
services, a complicated megastructure excluded all developers
except those who could manage large-scale development projects,
and the special zoning district contained the city's most
complex (and unpredictable) restrictions. There was no market
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for the proposed regional shopping mall, and the housing mix
was only feasible with federal and state moneys which were no
longer available.
In his history of the site, Alexander Cooper observed:
"... the financial costs of massive self-contained projects are
out of scale with the public benefits derived from them." "The
plan was clearly not geared to an incremental building program
scheduled to last more than a decade."
In the fall of 1979, the New York State Urban Development
Corporation condemned Battery Park City and leased the land
back to the authority. Because of UDC's extraordinary zoning
powers, this effectively removed Battery Park City from city
jurisdiction. The Community Planning Board, City Planning
Commission and Board of Estimate no longer had control over the
development, although a memorandum of agreement between the
mayor and governor gave the city advisory review authority.
POD III (renamed Gateway Plaza) was completed on the
abandoned foundations according to a modified plan. (Connec-
tions to a second-level pedestrian path network were abandoned,
as was the network itself.) The project includes 1,712
dwelling units, parking, and limited retail uses.
At the same time, Cooper Eckstut Associates prepared new
development controls for the site. Rejecting much of the
flexibility in the city's zoning, Cooper opted for a set of
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more traditional development and zoning tools. Reflecting the
"generally accepted approach to large-scale site plans", the
new plan proposed detailed schemes for the public areas (i.e.,
streets and open spaces) and general guidelines for the
buildings. Street maps replaced the visual corridors; the
esplanade and parks supplanted easements on private land; an
illustrative site plan specified the organization and massing
of buildings, and conventional use and form regulations were
applied on a plot-by-plot basis.
Then, in 1980, Cooper prepared more detailed controls for
the commercial core, now named the World Financial Center. The
controls specified building locations, the configuration of
public spaces and even external finishes. A request for
proposals, incorporating the controls, was issued, and Olympia
& York was selected as developer with a proposal to develop the
entire core. Olympia & York held a limited architectural
competition and selected Cesar Pelli and Associates as project
architects.
The ground-breaking for the World Financial Center was
held in December of 1981 and less than one year later, the
first section of the esplanade opened. Cooper Eckstut prepared
design guidelines for phase three, the south residential area,
in April 1981 and the first building of the 12-building, 2,000
unit "Rector Place" was under construction by the beginning of
Cooper 1980
Cooper Eckstut
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1985.
Wayne Benjamin, in his 1983 thesis, argues that the suc-
cession of plans for Battery Park City illustrates changes in
fashion and philosophy in the field of urban design. The site
plan evolved from a self-contained community to an extension of
Lower Manhattan. The built form moved from an American version
of Le Corbusier's Radiant City (towers and slabs arrayed on an
undifferrentiated horizontal plane) to a multi-level mega-
structure and then to an extensive mixed-use development inte-
grated by a circulation spine and finally to a conscious and
explicit revival of 19th century development patterns.
The essence of Cooper Eckstut's proposals is the extension
of Lower Manhattan's street grid and the orientation of parcels
and buildings to the street. Two quotes summarize the firm's
intentions:
The multi-purpose street is seen as the prime
organizing element, instead of a complex decked
service spine. Architectural proposals reflect sur-
rounding conditions. Parcels with street frontage
are used as the basic development unit, in recogni-
tion of their adaptability and flexibility to
changing requirements.
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...the original 1811 street plan...has proven to be
remarkably adaptable to modern building and transpor-
tation technology. Even Manhattan's most successful
planned development, Rockefeller Center, owes much of
its environmental quality to its recognition of the
basic street grid.
The site is divided into blocks measuring 200 by 400 feet.
The east-west streets align with the Broadway grid, and where
West Avenue allows, connect directly to it.
It is no small irony that Cooper Eckstut defends the grid
for the same reasons Frederick Law Olmsted condemned it so
vehemently in 1877.
If a house to be used for many different purposes
must have many rooms and passages of various dimen-
sions and variously lighted and furnished, not less
must such a metropolis be specially adapted at dif-
Olmsted and Croes ferent points to different ends.
Among its vices, Olmsted scored the 1807 [sic] grid for
its lack of prominent sites for monumental buildings and for
lots that are too deep for individual houses yet too shallow
for well lit and ventilated large structures. Only the largest
building gets light, air, and access from two streets. Olmsted
particularly condemned the absence of alleys for reasons
peculiar to the late 19th century: garbage and cesspool soil
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must otherwise be carried through the house. More relevant to
contemporary concerns is his argument that alleys provide
suitable sites for small houses and shops.
There is no evidence that Cooper Eckstut prepared studies
of the light, air, and views that their plan would afford
dwelling units. In defense of the plan, however, there is
sufficient variation in the street pattern to provide prominent
sites and to provide views of the harbor.
The land use plan placed all office uses directly opposite -
the World Trade Center to take advantage of excellent rail
access and proximity to Wall Street. Phasing put the office
complex first: commercial development would provide a much
higher yield than residential and would improve the authority's
cash flow for the construction of infrastructure. It was
expected that the two office complexes would strengthen the
market in that part of Manhattan, improving the fortunes of
both in a synergistic effect. A bridge from the World Trade
Center's plaza level would carry an estimated 30,000 employees
a day to the World Financial Center's lobby level. More would
come to shop and dine in the Winter Garden.
The plan placed the larger and more dense residential
district to the south of the commercial core, while the
northern residential area was to have a smaller scale com-
patible with the adjoining Tribeca district. No densities were
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specified, but it was expected that design guidelines for
specific neighborhoods (Rector Place, Battery Place, etc.)
would yield floor-area ratios ranging from 9 to 12. Thirty
percent of the site was given over to public space. Three
major public spaces were linked by the esplanade. While Cooper
Eckstut would design most of the public spaces, plans for the
residential areas would be implemented by street mapping,
zoning, and design guidelines (some of which would be incor-
porated into ground leases).
Documentation of Battery Park City emphasizes the
project's traditional planning approaches, but the six million
square foot commercial core recalls the megastructure or mixed-
use planning model. There is, in fact, a consistent ambiguity
in Cooper Eckstut's writing about the relative merits of small-
scale and large-scale development. On the one hand, the firm
focussed its critique of previous planning efforts on the 1969
plan's hostility to small and medium scale developers. In
reference to Rector Place, 2r9,921v2 Arabit29tule quotes
Cooper Eckstut:
Thinking small in this context means to break the
overall project into as many small parcels as
possible to encourage participation by a greater
number of developers and architects. The goal also
is to permit the individual parts to be financed more
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easily and to foster the complexity the designers see
as a key to urbanity. (ExogreA2132 &b1t;2.g.
65:1, January 1984, pp. 136-7.)
In reference to the commercial core itself, Cooper Eckstut
cites the locational advantages for "sufficient flexibility to
provide a range of large or small development parcels adjacent
to the World Trade Center." Moreover, "The overall design
should accommodate a multiple-developer approach and accommo-
date a staged development over a 10-15 year period."
In fact, Cooper Eckstut opted for an "integrated develop-
ment of separate buildings". In the commercial core, parcel
lines were of secondary importance in designing the project.
Instead, the design guidelines specified the maximum total
floor-area ratio (15), the maximum building height (51 stories,
one-half the height of the World Trade Center), and the place-
ment of towers on podiums (to reduce the street scale). The
FAR was pooled and could be shifted between parcels. More
detailed regulations specified street and utility requirements,
public and private open spaces, the treatment of waterside
frontages, connections and circulation needs, physical and
visual relationships to surroundings, and various other urban
design characteristics. The controls were flexible to accom-
modate a changing market, and they would only be written into
the ground leases and new zoning after negotiations had been
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concluded with the selected developer(s).
Olympia & York's proposal was cited for most closely
adhering to the request for proposals, but in fact it was
markedly different from the illustrative site plan. As
designed by Cesar Pelli, the project turned the gallery perpen-
dicular to the river (it had been parallel) and added a pair of
buildings to form a gateway at Liberty Street. Exercising
options in the 1980 design guidelines, it added a tower on the
former American Stock Exchange site south of Liberty Street and
deleted parcels 1 and 2 between North End Avenue and the river.
In a major departure from Cooper Eckstut's plans, the number of
towers on the original site was reduced from seven to three and
the footprints were doubled to the 40,000-45,000 square foot
range. (The total number of towers on the enlarged site was
four.) In effect, Cooper Eckstut's parcelization scheme was
abandoned.
Considerable shifts in the site plan were required. The
parcel between North End Avenue and the river was left vacant;
it was now too small for the bulkier buildings. (Cooper
Eckstut had sketched two towers on the site.) Only two,
instead of three, towers could fit between North End Avenue and
West Street. The bulk of Tower C (the Shearson/American
Express Building) shifted the Winter Garden and pedestrian
bridge to the south, leaving room for only one tower (instead
Battery Park City Authority
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of two) north of Liberty Street. The southernmost tower and
the Liberty Street "gatehouses" appropriated and effectively
privatized Liberty Street for the World Financial Center. In
response to the downgrading of Liberty Street, the next street
south, Albany Street, was upgraded and widened: what was
originally intended to be Rector Places' backdoor was now a
redundant, major approach to the esplanade.
The retail and pedestrian circulation concepts remain
unclear in both the Cooper Eckstut and Olympia & York schemes.
First, concerning the pedestrian system, Cooper Eckstut wrote:
A weather-protected public walkway system shall
connect the office buildings to each other, to the
North Cove Plaza and to the World Trade Center
Bridge. This system requires coordination between
the developers (who would provide lobbies and walkway
connections within their buildings) and the authority
(which would be responsible for bridging streets to
Cooper 1980 interconnect buildings).
Then retail frontage was to occur in three places: the
perimeter street frontage, the North Cove Plaza frontage, and
along the upper level pedestrian walkway. The upper level
"retail should be directly accessible from the upper level
pedestrian walkway system". But "elevator lobbies (were) to be
separated by glass enclosures from the walkway system for
131
security reasons." Finally, the North Cove Plaza frontage
would be enclosed by the Winter Garden. But, "the authority
proposes that the Winter Garden will be developed when suffi-
cient demand exists and a private developer is found to build
it." It is not explained why a developer would want to build
the Winter Garden, since the guidelines do not mention any
income-producing uses that could operate in the space.
In sum, Cooper Eckstut presented an unclear concept of
pedestrian circulation and retail uses. Olympia & York has
reduced some of the confusion, but problems remain. First,
Olympia & York recognized that the heaviest pedestrian movement
is at the upper level where the World Trade Center bridge
connects to the elevator lobbies. Most of the retail space is
at this level. The retail suffers from its secondary position
in relationship to the secure elevator lobbies (pedestrian
paths make arching detours around the lobbies) and depths are
so great (100 feet in places) that secondary circulation will
be required unless unusually large tenants can be found. (If
the World Trade Center's concourse is comparable, tenants are
likely to be small.) Second, Olympia & York realized that a
major gesture would be required to attract pedestrians from the
lobby level to the plaza level. The Winter Garden was trans-
formed from an add-on into the link between the two levels.
Still, there is no apparent reason why pedestrians would
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venture beyond the Winter Garden to shop in the retail spaces
that radiate from the core. Finally, Olympia & York has
fronted retail on the streets and plaza as required by the
guidelines. While commendable from an urban design perspec-
tive, there is no indication in the overall pedestrian circula-
tion scheme that there will be sufficient foot traffic in these
areas to support the planned uses.
Conclusio
There is no evidence that the form or dimensions of the
programmed buildings informed the site plan, as built. What
did survive were a diagram of pedestrian circulation and the
general disposition of building masses. The program controlled
the total square footage and floor-area ratio, and guidelines
restricted height, street walls, and setbacks. The illustra-
tive site plan (with its building perimeters and 30-foot column
grids) was largely ignored.
Appendix B
Case Study:
Kendall Square, Cambridge, Mass.
This case study concerns Kendall Square in East Cambridge,
Massachusetts. It is specifically concerned with the develop-
ment that has become known as Cambridge Center encompassing
parcels 2, 3, and 4 of the Kendall Square Urban Renewal Area,
an area of about 20 acres. To fill out the historical account,
additional abutting parcels are also considered in brief.
History
The Kendall Square project began in 1950 with the
designation of the five-acre "Rogers Block" as a redevelopment
site. Two hundred families were relocated in the next seven
years. In 1957, the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority was
created. It took over the site and cleared it. MIT and Cabot,
Cabot and Forbes developed "Tech Square", a complex of four
buildings containing 500,000 square feet of offices, which was
largely rented by 1965. Directly north of Tech Square, the
Draper Laboratories replaced the former Lever Brothers plant.
Cambridge Redevelopment Authority
Shalom and Shapiro
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In 1964, MIT President James Killian presented a proposal
to the Cambridge City Council to develop 42 acres in Kendall
Square: 28 acres for NASA (parcels 1 and 2) and 14 acres for
private development (parcels 3 and 4). The Kendall Square
Renewal Area was declared, and a renewal plan was adopted by
the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority. The City Council voted
to offer the site to NASA, a move that would displace 94 com-
panies and 3,000 jobs, primarily blue-collar. Architect Edward
Durrell Stone designed one high-rise building and a plan for
the NASA site. The plan was abandoned when the Architects
Collaborative designed the four low-rise buildings. The firm
of Imre and Anthony Halasz developed a detailed plan for the
remainder of the site reflecting the existing buildings, a
system of internal public spaces, and an image of stacked
buildings that architect Imre Halasz likened to Machu Picchu.
NASA had originally sought a secure campus environment, but
Halasz persuaded them to develop a public setting. The plan
was approved in 1968, but only the landscaping was built. NASA
announced the closing of its Electronics Research Center in
late 1969.
The NASA complex was transferred to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and the unbuilt part of the NASA site. (parcel
2) was conveyed back to the Redevelopment Agency. (CRA did not
actually get title until 1976.) Meanwhile, there had been a
Source: Monacelli 1976
Monacelli (n.d.)
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series of attempts to develop parcels 3 and 4. The Polaroid
Corporation commissioned I.M. Pei and Partners to do a plan in
the mid-1960's. The plan was judged infeasible and no action
was taken. In 1972, the CRA issued a reprogrammed concept plan
for parcels 2, 3, and 4 based on studies by consultants Glad-
stone Associates and Wallace McHarg Roberts and Todd. The plan
called for one million square feet of offices, a 400-room hotel
and 200,000 square feet of retail on parcels 3 and 4. There
would be 1,750 units of market-rate housing on parcel 2. The
entire development was to be united with a pedestrian circula-
tion system one level above the street. The plan was abandoned
in 1973 due to intense community opposition and lack of
developer interest.
Three different programs were developed during the ensuing
controversy. The "neighborhood" plan authored by MIT and the
business community was adopted in 1974, but all three proposals
were evaluated in an environmental impact report issued in
1976. The preferred plan, virtually the same as the neighbor-
hood plan, called for 670,000 square feet of light industry on
parcel 2 and a mix of offices, hotel, residences, and retail on
parcels 3 and 4. The total development package included
2,300,000 square feet of development (not including parking) at
a net floor-area ratio of 2.8. Parking was to be in
structures.
The EIS made certain assumptions about the distribution of
land uses, and illustrative site plans were prepared for each
plan but no land use or urban design plan had been prepared
when Monacelli Associates was hired in 1975 to prepare urban
design and implementation recommendations. A three-part
program resulted: a revised urban renewal plan (adopted in
1977), a new mixed-use zoning ordinance (also adopted in 1977),
and design development guidelines, all of which were incor-
porated in a request for development proposals for parcels 3
and 4. Boston Properties was selected as developer in 1979.
Following selection, Monacelli developed a master plan
framework (also known as the master action planning model) and
a concept design plan, both of which became legal covenants in
the development agreement. Davis Brody designed the first
building (Cambridge Center) while Moshe Safdie & Associates
served as planners and later as architects. In 1982, Boston
Properties was also selected to develop parcel 2 under a
separate agreement.
(Note: The Badger/Cambridge Gateway Building, Riverfront
Office Park (101 Main Street), Riverside Place (Cambridge Park-
way), etc., are not in the renewal area and were developed
under conventional zoning provisions.)
Monacelli 1976
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CRA considered the neighborhood program as the minimum
level of development, but it barely fit the site. As the area
was divided and developed it was essential that every building
realize the programmed FAR. At the same time, the remaining
land should be of a suitable size and shape for subsequent
efficient development.
Because of its rigid dimensional requirements, parking was
particularly problematical. It would not be possible to place
small inefficient decks on each site without eventually running
short of developable land. There had to be some means of
centralizing parking while meeting the requirements of the
zoning ordinance.
Overall, the success of the project from both the city's
and the developer's view depended on improvements to the image
of Kendall Square. The surrounding streets and sidewalks
should project a unified image of quality while the private
development should include a full package of amenities for both
employees and visitors. The pending construction of the MBTA
station could serve as the focus of an active public space.
The amenities package would only be feasible with a large-
scale integrated project, but the real estate market of the
mid-70's gave little encouragement. Sluggishness in all real
estate sectors led CRA's consultant, R.M. Bradley, to conclude
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that the project could only be built out in small, financially
independent increments. Recognizing the inefficiencies
inherent in such a process, Bradley projected only 1.8 million
square feet of development instead of the 2.3 called for by the
plan.
In subsequent negotiations, Boston Properties systemati-
cally resisted any physical or financial integration of the
project. It sought to minimize the front end development costs
and to keep each use an independent legal and financial
package.
In the face of pressures to fragment the project,
Monacelli prepared a three-part program to promote some minimal
coherence. First, a master action plan specified a united
design for streetscape, pedestrian routes, plazas, open space
and landscaping. Second, land takeouts were to be gerry-
mandered to the absolute minimum needed to satisfy the FAR
goals. Among other things, the garage on parcel 4 lay on three
legally separate lots. Third, a 30-foot column grid was laid
over both parcels 3 and 4. Originally parallel to Broadway,
the grid was reoriented to Main Street after negotiations with
Boston Properties and Moshe Safdie & Associates.
(Note: In a conversation with this writer, Lawrence Blue-
stone of Monacelli Associates stated that the parcelization
system would not have worked had there been multiple developers
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since there are multiple cross easements.)
In the course of negotiations, Monacelli abandoned plans
for a second-level walk system crossing Main Street to MIT.
There are continuing differences over the role of retail use in
the project. Monacelli seeks a mixed-use project with 24-hour
activities, while the developer keeps his eye on profitable
office development. Designs originally called for ground-floor
retail space along all street frontages, but the developer
demurred claiming retail demand was weak.
Presumably, these discussions will continue throughout the
development period. CRA (represented by Monacelli) retains
full review authority over the schematic, design development,
and construction document stages. The applicable guidelines
are contained in the urban renewal plan and mixed-use zoning
provisions (both of which are legally binding) and in the urban
design analysis and land use control strategy. As Mr. Blue-
stone put it "the real plan emerges when there is a real
developer".
Conclusion
The form and dimensions of the blocks were determined by
the circulation plan. Parcelization was never considered a way
of implementing the program; instead, it was manipulated to
achieve the FAR targets. Building footprints were considered
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only after the developer was selected, and then there is no
evidence that the 30-foot grid has controlled the form of the
development in any perceivable sense.
Instead, the program and the pedestrian-circulation
diagram have been the most persistant elements of the plan.
The Redevelopment Authority has relentlessly sought to see the
full square footage built, while Monacelli's plans for the
station area and pedestrian/fire lane have become the central
elements around which buildings and uses are being organized.
The developer's intransigence on retail uses may frustrate at-
tempts to "activate" the pedestrian spaces.
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Appendix C
Case Study:
Mission Bay, San Francisco
Mission Bay is an area of 208.5 gross acres (159 net),
that lies one mile south of San Francisco's central business
district. It is currently underutilized industrial land with a
mix of small-scale manufacturing, warehousing, railroad yards,
and an elevated interstate highway stub (1-280). The fourth
plan for the site is being prepared in 1985. It is expected
that the city and landowner will sign a development agreement
in 1986, at the earliest. This case study summarizes the plan
to date.
History
The first plan, a feasibility study, was completed by John
Carl Warnecke in the spring of 1982. Soon after that, two
firms -- I.M. Pei and Partners and Wallace Roberts and Todd--
were hired under separate contracts to prepare a master plan
for the site. The planners held five series of public meetings
through the fall, with the last in December. At the same time,
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WRT prepared a series of working papers on everything from
contextual factors to planning considerations for water
amenities. The "initial concept proposal" was presented to the
Planning Commission on April 28, 1983 along with an elaborate
model of the project.
Southern Pacific presented the plan as a "new San Fran-
cisco community", but the public quickly perceived it as a new
downtown. It comprised 11.7 million square feet of offices on
37.61 net acres; an additional 4.3 million square feet of
research and development on 33.04 acres; 7,260 dwelling units
on 50.15 acres; and 520,000 square feet of hotel and retail
space on 1.63 acres. Parking was to be in structures through-
out the site at the following rates: 1.326 spaces per 1,000
square feet of office and four per 1,000 square feet gross
Southern Pacific leasable area of retail. (Figures for residential and R&D were
not available as of this writing.)
The intensity of development proposed was truly stag-
gering. Offices were to reach 42 stories in height with an
overall net floor-area ratio of 7.15. The net residential
density g2y.U2gp 146 dwelling units per acre, but studies by
WRT contemplated densities up to 278 dwelling units per acre.
The most closely comparable densities cited were San Fran-
cisco's Russian and Telegraph Hills (80 to 140 units per acre)
and New York's Upper West Side and West Village (125 to 175
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units per acre).
The allowance for research and development may have been
something of a sleight of hand. Though there were vague allu-
sions to Silicon Valley-type uses, no clear distinction was
made between R&D and office. One observer speculated that,
because of its lower parking index, the designation of R&D was
a ruse to lower overall parking requirements.
The project quickly got embroiled in the on-going debate
over a new city stadium. Among the sites being considered were
one on Mission Bay and another directly north of it. Although
WRT had considered a stadium among the alternatives for the
site, the proposed plan ignored the issue entirely.
At the same time, the city sought to increase Mission
Bay's assessment on the basis of the company's proposal. When
S.P. balked, Supervisor Bill Maher threatened an initiative to
condemn the land at S.P.'s price. It was also Maher who
threatened an initiative to rezone the entire parcel to resi-
dential use only.
Negotiations between S.P. and the city followed, then
broke off, and resumed as the stadium's potential waxed and
waned. S.P. presented a modified proposal, and the Department
of City Planning, at the mayor's direction, prepared a counter-
proposal that was more in tune with existing planning policy.
In response to its tepid reception, Southern Pacific an-
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nounced a slightly scaled down version of the plan on May 1,
1984. There would be 9 million square feet of offices and only
1.1 million of research and development. Housing was increased
to 9,250 dwelling units, 1,000 to be built by the city on land
donated by Southern Pacific. Retail was the same at 500,000
square feet. The maximum building height was dropped to 35
stories.
The revised plan was no more welcome than the first. On
June 23, 1984 Southern Pacific withdrew the proposal. Intense
negotiations ensued, and on August 3, 1984, Mayor Dianne Fein-
stein announced a tentative land use agreement which provided
for 4,125,000 square feet of office; 2,601,000 square feet of
research and development, 201,000 square feet of retail, and
6,544 dwelling units. The agreement specified that 30% of the
housing units have subsidies, half from the developer and half
from the city. No building would be higher than eight stories.
In a conversation with this writer on January 14, 1985, Dean
Macris, City Planning Director, stated that he understood that
the agreement established the maximum development the city
would allow on the site. Presumably, the development company
was proceeding under the assumption that it was being guaran
j~egd these same numbers.
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Analysis
If the other case studies in this series are any indica-
tion, most large-scale developments go through numerous plan-
ning iterations before they are realized. Thus, while it is
useful to analyze what Southern Pacific did wrong, realistical-
ly speaking, things went no worse than should have been
expected. Even so, it is possible to identify four major areas
of possible improvement: the overall intensity of the project,
the intensity of office development in particular, the location
of high-rises, and procedural issues.
Qyg.g2 JD%2Dil;=. No one outside of Southern Pacific
knows why the company sought such extremely intense develop-
ment. S.P. maintained throughout that it could not otherwise
cover the costs of infrastructure. A source in the mayor's
office stated: "We didn't believe their economic arguments
about the necessity of developing so much in order to pay for
the infrastructure." Speculation focuses on two areas. First,
the company was suffering cash flow problems and hoped to sell
off large parcels of the Mission Bay property, presumably the
residential areas, at maximum value. Southern Pacific had
experience in industrial and office development, but none in
residential. But, in a statement issued January 25, 1983, the
company stated:
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Southern Pacific is in the Mission Bay development
"for the long haul". Portions of the project will be
developed in joint venture, and certain sites
developed from time to time may be sold outright.
However, S.P. intends to remain ultimately respon-
sible for carrying out the overall objectives of the
Mission Bay Master Plan.
The company did not elaborate on how it would maintain
this responsibility, particulary if the land were sold.
The second area of speculation focussed on Santa Fe's
proposed takeover of S.P. S.P.'s bargaining position may have
been enhanced if the value of its real estate portfolio were
inflated. Santa Fe did, in fact, acquire S.P. in the late
spring of 1984, a move that led to the abandonment of the
Pei/WRT plan and negotiations with the city.
Throughout the controversy, S.P. maintained that it could
accept no less development if it were to realize a reasonable
rate of return on its holdings. Outside of the company, no one
is able to explain why Santa Fe agreed to the much smaller
development package.
,Qilig IDtgDgily. The intensity of the proposed office
development reflected S.P.'s profit objectives, but may also
have been partly the doing of I.M. Pei and Partners. Pei, it
seems, had been promised the contract to design the first
Southern Pacific
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office tower. Not knowing which tower would be first, the firm
put most of the office space in a cluster of tall structures.
Even if a relatively small one were selected to initiate the
development, it would provide a sizable fee.
No move could have more surely predestined the plan's
early demise. Office development, particularly in high-rises,
has been San Francisco's hottest political issue for well over
a decade. There is no consensus in the city over the virtues
of the growing office sector. Any plan proposing offices on
any scale was sure to rouse widespread opposition. Clustering
it all in buildings reaching 42 stories provided doubters with
a highly visible and easily understandable symbol of the future
city they sought to avoid.
By comparison, there is strong consensus over the need for
massive intervention in the housing market, since the San
Francisco exceeds even New York city in housing prices.
Mission Bay provides the only opportunity for major new con-
struction. While there is disagreement over the allocation of
types, tenure and subsidies, the need for additional housing is
not questioned. Thus, there has been little change in the
residential numbers from first plan to tentative agreement.
High-Rise Location. The third area of potential improve-
ment was in the location of the high-rise cluster. In a move
that WRT surely regrets, the consultant recommended that high-
rises be concentrated at the northeast corner of the-site where
bedrock is deepest. The rationale was that any construction
there would require pilings, and it would be more economical to
spread the cost over more building area. Manhattan's profile
belies this reasoning: all but a few high-rises are clusterd
where the bedrock is most shallow, in Midtown and Lower
Manhattan. WRT's own Working Paper Number 4, "Environmental
Study Factors", stated that intense development should go over
shallower bedrock.
In addition, WRT argued that high-rises should not block
views from Potrero Hill to downtown. As much had been made
clear in the public hearings. But the cluster in the northeast
corner of the site blocked views towards San Francisco Bay and
the Bay Bridge, a much more serious offense to the residents'
affections. Opposition from Potrero Hill, the only residential
neighborhood directly affected by the project, quickly focussed
on the view issue.
The only possible justification for the location of the
high-rises was to put them closest to downtown. (In the
Battery Park City case study, the commercial core was located
opposite the World Trade Center to take advantage of economies
of aggregation and access to rail transportation.) This reason
was never cited for Mission Bay, however.
E£li&;ics. S.P.'s final, and most devasting, error was
Wallace Roberts and Todd 1982(a)
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political. Not only were its public relations poor, but it
seemed to have no idea what steps it would have to go through
to get the city's approval. In the city's mixed form of goven-
ment where the mayor, Chief Administrative Officer (city
manager) and Board of Supervisors (city council) share power in
equal portion, plans are subject to multiple approvals over a
period of months or years during which time projects are often
radically altered. Moveover, both state and federal environ-
mental regulations must be followed. S.P. acted as if the
mayor had the power to approve its proposal outright.
As outlined by Sedway Cooke Associates, Mission Bay would
require the following: amendments to the master plan and
planning code and an environmental impact report on both; the
preparation of a development proposal and the adoption (by the
Board) of a development agreement; and an EIR on the develop-
ment agreement and first phase permits. (A development agree-
ment is a contract between the developer and city that protects
the developer from later changes in city policy. See
California Government Code Secs. 65864 et seq.)
The form of the plan seems almost incidental at this
point. In announcing the tentative agreement, the mayor hailed
the "fabulous lagoon and landscaped island", but the planning
director indicated to this writer that the form of the plan was
subject to complete revision. The only constraint is that all
office development is to be located north of Mission Creek.
Under the circumstances, it is understandable that San Fran-
ciscans were offended that the WRT/Pei plan won the 1984
Progressive Architecture award for urban design. To the extent
that some elements may appear in subsequent plans, it may still
be worthwhile to examine the first proposal.
The plan was organized on two basic principles: one was
to relate the street pattern to the two San Francisco street
grids which intersect at the site; the other was a baroque
scheme of rondpoints, vistas and formal public spaces cul-
minating in two set pieces, the high-rise cluster and the
island, that recalled (wittingly or unwittingly) Burnham's pre-
quake plan for the city. The planning began with a series of
"Notes on Process and Planning Mission Bay" by Jack Sidener of
WRT. The notes are a comprehensive look at the site in context
and propose a number of design concepts that respond to views,
the city's grain, topography (both natural and built), street-
scape, and water form. Sketches went back and forth between
WRT and Pei.
It is not possible to analyze the evolution of the plan in
every detail because only WRT documented its studies and the
working papers end in October 1982, over five months from
Wallace Roberts and Todd 1982(b)
Wallace Roberts and Todd 1982(c)
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Sketch by Jack Sidener
presentation of the plan. It is worth noting, however, that
the major elements of the plan--the street/block pattern, high-
rise cluster, and the island--appear to have evolved indepen-
dently. On first glance, it seems that the island was intended
to form the transition between the two grids, but it is evident
upon closer examination that the cardinal grid crosses the
island from east to west and intersects the diagonal grid on
the west bank. The working papers reveal that the form of the
island was fixed when the entire site was covered with the
cardinal grid. The diagonal grid was introduced later. China
Basin and its landward extension, Mission Creek, were the
inspiration for the lagoons and canal that were central to the
plan from its inception. The island was to evoke the outline
of Mission Bay before it was filled. Various forms were con-
sidered, but the record does not indicate how the proposed
island form was arrived at.
The one constant throughout the plan was a determination
to make the street space (and its expansion at squares) the
basic unit of design. Dan Solomon's "Change Without Loss"
inspired the form of residential streets, and Rob Krier may
have been the reference for the high-rise cluster and various
squares and parks. The planners borrowed a traditional plan-
ning device, the buffer, when it ringed the residential areas
with office and research and development structures. In
Wallace Roberts and Todd 1982(d)
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places, housing faces non-residential uses across the street,
in seeming violation of the intent of the streetscape model.
The block dimensions appear, at last, to be generated by
the surrounding street pattern which was extended into the
site. WRT studied a series of housing prototypes on a 220 by
396-foot block, but actual block sizes varied as conditions
dictated. This writer was unable to identify any similar
studies for non-residential uses. The 220-foot dimension was
selected because it most efficiently accommodated townhouse-
type housing on the perimeter and decked parking on the
interior. Parcel sizes seem not to have been considered.
One final but critical point is left uncovered in the
history. In one of its publicity pieces issued in July 1983,
Southern Pacific stated it would cover the costs of all infra-
structure: streets, utilities, sewerage, recreational and open
space amenities (presumably including the canals, weirs, and
bridges). It estimated the costs at $100 million or $800,000
per acre of developable land. Subsequent information, both
before and after the tentative agreement, does not indicate how
costs and control would be allocated. However the plan turns
out, its formal intentions may not be realized unless control
and financing are properly placed.
Vernez-Moudon 1983(a)
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Conclusion
The street pattern and resulting block layout were the
result of a design decision to extend the abutting grids into
the site. There is no evidence that building types informed
block dimensions or vice versa. None of the documentation
touches on parcelization.
I.M. Pei and Partners (but not WRT) have been selected to
provide continuing design services to Santa Fe. The plan
(complete with lagoon, island, and rectangular grids) will
probably survive in some form, even though the program has been
completely changed.
159
References
Christopher Alexander et al., AttarD LAaS .U . 19gQ 3.a
Buildings., Construction. New York: Oxford University Press,
1977.
Stanford Anderson, ed., QD B1t2212, based on a project of The
Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1978.
Donald Appleyard and Allan Jacobs, 192&Ad gD LJDAib fL9is
NAnil2fts Working Paper No. 384. Berkeley: University of
California, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, June
1982.
Yoshinobu Ashihara, lbs bazlbrlls 1229.92, trans. Lynne E.
Riggs. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983 (orig. L4.gbiDALi DD
biga]sD, 1979).
Yoshinobu Ashihara, 9=11-01 PggiD In &-cbi-tgct-g, trans.
Ikumi Hoshino. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970 (orig.
Gaibu kukang 9 kose., 1962).
Jonathan Barnett, &D Jntlp4dali9D 9ult a 92AiSD. New York:
Harper & Row, 1982.
Battery Park City Authority, Office of Public Information,
160
miscellaneous fact sheets.
"Battery Park City Master Plan and Guidelines", in Progressiye
Architecture 65:1, January 1984, pp. 136-7.
Wayne A. Benjamin,. What ig 9995 gLD E9ZLn? Thesis,
Master of City Planning and Master of Science in Architectural
Studies. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT, 1983.
Hans B1umenf e1d, 2bp L9dX.D L2gg991isi ;ts Qgi±n, ggNt11,
.r~aS$2xisgt12 And Ei1Aning. Selected essays by Hans
Blumenfeld, Paul D. Spreiregen, ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1967.
Hans Blumenfeld, "Scale in Civic Design" in T9jffL E.gflgifng
&22122, v. 24, no.1, April 1953.
Boston Affiliates, Lxigtgg g~g ggy gggt.
Supplemental Report No.3 to Draft Environmental Impact
Statement/Report, Third Harbor Tunnel Project, Interstate 90,
Boston, Mass. Federal Highway Administration and Mass. Dept.
of Public Works. FHWA-MA-EIS-82-02-D, December 1982.
Boston Affiliates, flgiLgi. B229.U922 3299gt. Supplemental
Report No. 3 to Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement/Report, Third Harbor Tunnel. Interstate 90/Central
Artery, Interstate 93, Boston, Mass. Federal Highway Adminis-
tration and Mass. Department of Public Works. FHWA-MA-EIS-82-
02-DS, June 1983.
Boston Landmarks Commission, "Topographical History of South
Boston", excerpt from Report of BLC, Appendix III, December
1970.
161
Boston Redevelopment Authority, .a Fort Point Channe Area.
Planning Ald Developmen Stu . Boston, December, 1977.
Melville C. Branch. Coparative Urban Design: Ra= Engravings.,
- . New York: Arno; and Los Angeles: University of
Southern California Press, 1978.
Building Owners and Managers Association International,
91)Q~w 9n.0 .9.9 2b~An Qlflag DUlils Zz925K1QnDc 9mcbaB22
Report. Washington, D.C.: the Association, annual.
Cambridge Redevelopment Authority, "Special Edition", in
Cambridg Chronicl, Thursday, December 16, 1982, 4pp.
James C. Canestaro, ZD l2nQ=D,9fti -.t tbg Psfl12 MAIaysiz -o
911192 SDildiD2. Development Component Series. Washington,
D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1983.
Grady Clay, .Qoase-Un: Bg jR the America City. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1973.
Belinda Lowenhaupt Collins, indoWg and Peoplei L Literature
Dy2y, Psycho ogical Reaction .to Enyironments Witb aD Without
Wnd2W. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce,
National Bureau of Standards, 1975.
George R. Collins and Christiane Crasemann Collins, _21119
Sitte AlLd the Birthf 92modern City 22anning. New York: Random
House, 1965.
Alexander Cooper Associates, Ballsly 2aljs Ci~ t Draft 5.uggAjv
B29.Qt ad# li.2.22 Nalg 2lD. Prepared for Battery Park City
Authority. New York: Battery Park City Authority, October
1979.
162
Alexander Cooper Associates, Hanna/Olin, and Vollmer
As soc iat e s, BgatktXy 2.X _ CikZ t9 QEgn59iaij&, 
_CgD$25g QDv Ip
DadnellDgg P1gJJ. New York: Battery Park City Authority,
October 1980.
Cooper Eckstut Associates, Batter Park gity Sout Residential
ble= DeiSD QDislDgs. Prepared for Battery Park City
Authority. New York: Battery Park City Authority, April 1981.
Gordon Cullen, The Concise Townscap New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold, 1961.
Fay, Spofford, and Thorndike, Sout Bosto Traffi Data, (Level
of Service, 24-hour Volume, Average Daily Traffic, Vehicle
Classification, Traffic Growth Projections). Boston, Mass.,
1977.
Ronald Lee Fleming and Lauri A. Halderman, QD .QpEDi Qg li
L-0DS1 Bbae2d L.9D-d fx9 292ND -c9EE9Do t-o DU1bAL EAik.
Harvard, Mass: Harvard Common Press, 1982.
Johann Friedrich Geist, Alsad.C= tbe flgl -o L B.it2. 9
lype, trans. Jane 0. Newman and John H. Smith. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1983 (orig. 22. 92=EiD Lfgygtyp $22 .
Jahrhunderts, 3rd ed. Munich: Prestel-Verlag, 1979).
Leslie Gould, JbQ bof Q9gq1 9gggEe B9 Sale
Devglop.ment: The Implications fo the Pubjic Environment A
,CAssg Bd _oi D_.tZWD BaD E.lABQ9n9. Thesis, Master of City
Planning, University of California, Berkeley, 1980(?).
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce and Boston Society of
Architects, Development Guidance Project, Change Aid Growth I
Central Boston. May 1984.
163
N. John Habraken et al., Mc Grunsfeld Variations.: b Rert M
Jb= Thematic Deloment _f AD Urban Tissue. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Laboratory of Architecture and Planning, 1981.
N. John Habraken et al., Variations.: The Systematic Design -f
SuDorts, trans. Wim Wiewel. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976
(orig. D-enken "D yAriante, 1974).
Haley & Aldrich, E9Ex$ 2_g1iD. t AbADDg.1 Eaibii Bud$v,
File No. 5054. Cambridge, Mass.: Haley & Aldrich, February 4,
1985.
David A. Harris et al., E2aBpiB2 adS .tnispiBn tbc QOffZc
Environme. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1981.
HFMW a joint venture, _2Ba22$Dal B, A222$19D EAAD &PB-22t.
Appendix 3 to Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement/Report, Third Harbor Tunnel, Interstate 90/Central
Artery, Interstate 93, Boston, Massachusetts. Federal Highway
Administration and Massachusetts Department of Public Works
FHWA-MA-EIS-82-02-DS, June 1983.
HFMW a joint venture, LgJd _Ug.,. _CfmDlity Edj_2tik Ad$
3922E12 LAItlyjij;y B&p9l. Supplemental Report No.4 to the
Supplement Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Report, Third
Harbor Tunnel, Interstate 90/Central Artery, Interstate 93,
Boston, Massachusetts. FHWA-MA-EIS-82-02-DS, June 1983.
Allan Jacobs, Lg&ingity EnngDDiDg jjg. Chicago: American
Society of Planning Officials, 1978.
Jane Jacobs, Tbg Death AD Li of Great American Cities New
York: Random House, 1961.
Col in S. Jones. BS2j2n2 fb22l2dn _&Di2t2X Jbsix L922g122.,
164
Planning AD Design. London: Business Books, 1969.
Jonathan Kaufman, "Work Malls: One-Stop Everything, 9-5", in
Boston Globe January 2, 1985, pp.21, 24.
Chester P. Keefe II, ed., LAfa912:N2A9D flDX191Yi
D-u2r.ta-en- _ol bxcbibt22bDx.x A BrElnAz ID 2f122 badi siD2&
Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1973.
Rob Krier, ElbAD B24A2, trans. Christine Czechowsi and George
Black. New York: Rizzoli, 1979 (orig. Stadtraum, 1975).
John Lund Kriken, "What's Wrong with Small Projects?" in DA
BeyigN, v.6, no.2/3. Chicago: American Planning Association,
Spring/Summer 1983.
Pierre Lavedan. Ou'est-ce D2a A.'aXLDisL&7 ZDItlgJdUshp A
l'histoire #2 l'urbanisme. Paris: Laurens, 1926.
Le Corbusier, _be Sibt 2o 22XX2 w AD .;ts iB2, trans.
Frederick Etchells. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971 (orig.
ULbDIgEng, 8th ed., 1929).
William R. Loudon, Downtown Crossing Strategy EAI. AD-endix ki
B-29DmoEi9 MArls-e Rc&ax-bAx _( =EA22 19:Bs=DA Be-d ae
Astlity 212olI. Prepared for the Boston Redevelopment
Authority. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Center for Transportation Studies, October 1983.
Kevin Lynch, "Environmental Adaptability", in 29DInAl 9o _th
America Institute gi E.anners, 1958/1, pp. 16-24.
Kevin Lynch, Qo City EgL. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1981 (or ig. A Tbspoy .Qoo C .itv EInE).
165
Kevin Lynch, Jhg JLaS _o b Siy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1960
Kevin Lynch and Gary Hack, gljt 2lADDiDS, 3rd ed. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1984.
Peter Manning, ed., Qffige P212jg L Stgdy 2o gDfvlgDE=Dt.
Liverpool: Pilkington Research Unit, Department of Building
Science, University of Liverpool, 1965.
Robert Snow Means Company, ftgnB Eygt2ED 992122 3A, 9th ed.
Kingston, Mass.: Means, 1983.
John C. Melaniphy, Jr., Commercia2 And Industrial Condominiums.
Washington D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1976.
Monacelli Associates, &D dal2. Cambridge, Mass.:
Monacelli, (n.d.).
Monacelli Associates, l Suare.: Urban Design Analy±
Am] Land Egg Contrl Strategy Cambridge, Mass.: Monacelli,
November 1976.
Stanislaus von Moos, 62 _9gbDis 1ED 9p -o A ubseig.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979 (orig. L2 C2gbeig.,
lemente einer Synthese, 1968).
National Association of Realtors, Institute of Real Estate
Management, jDcgEg/.2;ppDgP ADnlnqji& _1j192 L3j11j1.g,
Downtown =Ds Suburban. Chicago, Ill.: the Institute, annual.
New York Department of City Planning, Mfidtown efalopment. New
York: Department of City Planning, June 1981.
Nora Anca Nicul in, Tb. LQ22A-ii9 -of lhe Eala.giQBbip Z2t222
166
Energy CQnsumntion -D tbg Architecture o1 _be Highrise Off ic
EgildjDg. Thesis, Master of Architecture, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1982.
Frederick Law Olmsted and James R. Croes, "Preliminary Report
of the Landscape Architect and the Civil and Topographical
Engineer, upon the Laying Out of the Twenty-third and Twenty-
fourth Wards", City of New York, Document No.72 of the Board of
the Department of Public Parks, 1877. In S.B. Sutton, ed.,
QjlEtsd's WritjDqg 9D Qilt LAD d29422. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1971.
W. Paul O'Mara, Office Dv&lopment Handbook, Washington, D.C.:
ULI-the Urban Land Institute, 1982.
Alvin E. Palmer and M. Susan Lewis, jllDDLiS Zbj 91i9
Landscap. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977.
Parking Consultants Council and National Parking Association,
Ib-e DiEmcnai.Q of EArJin. Washington, D.C.: Urban Land
Institute and National Parking Association, 1979.
John F. Pi1e, QpeD Qffi2 21 2DjDi9.. k LQaDLb991590 AIfLD ej
DesiaD-ex ADS &b!_ic29ts. New York: Whitney Library of
Design, 1978.
William Pulgram and Richard E. Stonis, Designing bge Automated
Office. New York: Watson-Guptill, 1984.
Steen Eiler Rasmussen, Towns AlD DlMjding. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1951, 1969 (orig. 1949).
John Wi ll iam Reps, XbTh.gs aiDn 25 JLaDg _ELngeg i L i-
_C~ty gannin in the Unite States. Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
167
ton University Press, 1965.
David Rockefeller, &AjoX JE95922E2Dnt& LaBQ U.S
Tx2n992X 19A 1 % Z==922 BADbageg4. Prepared by
Skidmore, Owings and Merrill. New York: Downtown-Lower
Manhattan Association, 1963.
Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter, _Qollag City. Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press, 1978.
Bernard Rudofsky, Streets f= Pe9p e Primer f_ol Americans.
Garden City: Doubleday, 1969.
San Francisco Department of City Planning, The Downtown 2Dln
Proposal 191 Citizen Egyigy. San Francisco: City and County
of San Francisco, August 1983 (a).
San Francisco Department of City Planning, "Procedure for
Review of Mission Bay Project", April 28, 1983 (b).
San Francisco Office of the Mayor, "Mayor Announces Agreement
on Mission Bay". Press Release, August 3, 1984.
Michael Saphier, Elanninbg t Eh y Office. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1978.
Lynn Sedway & Associates, EAle Alto Downtown Retail Study. San
Rafael, Calif.: Lynn Sedway, 1982.
Steve Shalom and Bob Shapiro, 129_ Tbr2Cg L4.aBy .29b B92lge
ML4's Bol iD jg Transformation . Cambridge. Cambridge: New
England Free Press, 1969.
Camillo Sitte, jty Elanning According jo Artisti Principl ,
trans. G. Collins and C. Collins. New York: Random House,
168
1965 (orig. 1889).
Southern Pacific Development Company, "Mission Bay San
Francisco: Background Information About the Property and the
Initial Master Plan Concept." San Francisco: S.P. Development
Co., April 28, 1983.
Spaulding and Slye, "The Boston Area Report". Quarterly.
Paul D. Spreiregen, DrbAD .2§S92 b.9 A=1i29lDE2 9f T9Lf&
ad Cities. Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing,
c. 1965, 1981.
Stichting Architecten Research, LjdjD .0 n fDln.ity _Z
Inestigation in= High-Densi~ty Alkjjlalt Wijtb A _YleNy 19 Jbjg
Waldec Area., th Hague. Eindhoven, Holland: SAR, June, 1977.
Stichting Architecten Research, SAg 21;. The bholgqical For-
ELulation .of A-greements Concerning .the Direct jglliD9 EDyiron-
ment. Eindhoven, Holland: SAR, 1973.
Todreas/Hanley Associates and Karl B. Radov, 9j12e2g 19
.QS~nbigz592S= -CA~biis22 CgnDt-ei B-etgil ESsbl Bt &dyX.
Prepared for the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority and Boston
Properties. Cambridge, Mass.(?), December 1982.
United States Public Buildings Service, Jbg EBB LjigdiD
EX5SyEE Etg9nz 2 g AgndS 2esiig9LAD-c- Ep229iii92At19D j15 .91figga
Al gi2 Ibr. E229b B99);. Washington, D.C.: General
Services Administration, 1975.
ULI-the Urban Land Institute, Industril gygelopment Handbook.
Washington, D.C.: ULI, 1975.
ULI-the Urban Land Institute, = .a l and Cents .of Shopping
169
.ggDjg2. Washington, D.C.: ULI 1984 (a).
ULI-the Urban Land Institute, IL. 1.28A Eall . 22§D1 2,g2o Qt
.U22bh.1 B22IDU. BAZZA=b221129 Ax19 gDAe.. dy
Washington, D.C.: the ULI, 1984 (b).
Anne Vernez-Moudon, "Blocks, Lots and Houses" in jpg2. gnd
B22122, v.6, no.22, pp. 110-117. Florence, Italy: Sansoni;
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, June 1983 (a).
Anne Vernez-Moudon, "Thinking Tall But Small", P.C.: Monograph
Update Two. Prepared for the Council on Tall Buildings and
Urban Habitat. December 1983 (b).
Walter F. Wagner, "Round Table: The Office Environment--Can We
Make Better Places for People to Work?" in Architectural Recor
interiors .o 124. Mid-September 1984, pp. 33-47.
Wallace McHarg Roberts and Todd, and Conklin Rossant, L.W2C
M anhattan lAD. New York: City Planning Commission, 1966.
Wallace Roberts and Todd, "Mission Bay Master Plan, Working
Paper No.4" Environmental Study Factors". June 29, 1982 (a).
Wallace Roberts and Todd, "Mission Bay Master Plan. Working
Paper No.7: Early Notes on Design Concepts." June 29, 1982
(b).
Wallace Roberts and Todd, "Mission Bay Master Plan. Working
Paper No.13: Urban Design Concepts." September 28, 1982 (c).
Wallace Roberts and Todd, "Mission Bay Master Plan. Working
Paper No.14: Housing Prototypes." September 29, 1982 (d).
Donald Watson, ed., ZD.0fLy C22n22CZ5y2 'bm222b fLn11.2n
170
Design. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
Ken White, Bookstone E.anning And Design. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1982.
Peter G. White, Shops f Shopkeepers.: Retailers' Reauirements
in odern Shopping Dvl&popments. White Knights Reading, Eng:
Center for Advanced Land Use Studies, 1977.
William H. Whyte, Tb Egial L± 9f OrAll ElbAD B29A922n.
Washington, D.C.: Conservation Foundation, 1980.
Robert E. Witherspoon, Jon P. Abbett, and Robert M. Gladstone,
N1325 Ap&R lA.Z. Df fl2. Washington,
D.C.: ULI--the Urban Land Institute, 1976.
171
